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CHAPTER I
RELIGION AND THE STUDY OF SECULARIZATION
Scientific Traditions
Secularization can be conceived as only one branch within the
scientific study of religion. Since this study is based on a
certain theoretical framework, a first step to take in
determining what secularization is all about is to look at
the contextual location of secularization within the more
complex scientific study of religion. A general discussion of
the theoretical context of the study of religion, as far as
it is relevant to secularization, will be attempted in what
follows
.
The study of religion can be carried out from various
perspectives. Scientists of different faculties approach
religion from a philosophical, anthropological, theological,
or sociological perspective. For the present study, it seems
to be most compatible to discuss the subject through sociolo-
gical lenses. In what follows, then, referencies to religion
and secularization should be understood from this perspec-
tive .
Two traditions are found in the study of religion. The first
is derived from Cartesian dualism and hence is called the
dualistic tradition. The second one is the wholistic tradi-
tion; it belongs methodologically to the phenomenological and
hermeneutical epistemology.
1
The dualistic conception in the study o£ religion sees,
basically, a gap between the individual subjective se lf as a
thinking and acting being, and the surrounding objective
world in which the individual is living. From this dualism
arises the concept of alienation, which Marx understood in
terms of the industrial worker's no longer being able to
identify with her/his products. Weber's concept is the
"Entzauberung der Welt'' or disenchantment
.
the decline of
meaning and symbol through a more and more rationalizing
society, by, this development loses control over the objec-
tive world that it itself once had created. Durkheim's
concept describes this alienation as an isolation of the
individual from society and social life, expressing itself
through different moral and ethical connotations of the
individual and of the society.
Since this subject-object dichotomy was the major problem for
the human being in modern society, the humanisitc goal was,
logically, to reunite both and, thus, to reinstall the
subject as the master of the object. The key to this enter-
prise was conceived to be a skeptical view towards the
objective world and a general application of skeptical
knowledge
:
Demystification of the object world and of the
forces in it impelling fear and estrangement in the
knowing self was to be accomplished by adopting a
skeptical attitude concerning the "objectivity" or
reality of the object world.
. .Once the world of
objects was thus unmasked, it could be re-created,
2
controlled, and appropriated by
own uses. In this way subject and
reunited and alienation was to be
the self for its
object were to be
overthrown
.
1
This application of skeptical knowledge has certain important
consequences for the study of religion within the dualistic
tradition. Religion as belonging to an objective world,
conceived from a Cartesian perspective, was, hence, out of
reach of human control and manipulation, with superhuman
entities dominating this realm, even putting contraints and
limitations on human affairs. The application of skeptical
attitudes to the objective world resulted in a critical
observation of the objectivity of religion, "...by demonstra-
ting that forces perceived religiously as emanating from the
gods were in fact identifiable as alienated elements of the
human world itself." 2
This attempted demonstration is the basis of what Wuthnow
calls the "radical sociology of knowledge"; it tried
reductionis tically to show by empirical investigation that
these religiously perceived forces were in fact reflections
of contexts of an entirely human origin. Paradoxically this
reduc tionistic view of the radical sociology of knowledge ran
parallel to the humanistic traditions in the quest to regain
1 Wuthnow, R. Two Traditions in the Study of Religion,
in : Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
,
Vol.20, No . 1 , 1981, p . 18f
2 Wuthnow, R., op.cit., p.19
3
the object world for the subject,
while at
initially
,
scientific
realm of
realm of
tions
.
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the same time it apeared, at least
to provide a firm foundation for
analysis by reducing the subjective
religious belief to the more objective
economic
, social
, and biological condi-
Hence, though the radical sociology has its roots in the
dualistic tradition, it developed in reverse direction to the
humanisitc apporach insofar, as it transfered the objectively
understood religion into a the realm of human control, that
is, into the subject world. By this replacement of religion
from the object world to the subject, radical sociology of
knowledge used observable social variables related to
religion that were gained through reductionist methods to
explain religious belief itself. Or, as Wuthnow has put the
matter, the effort was made to "explain the unknown with the
known .
"
The entire dualistic tradition, with two competing strains,
namely humanism and radical sociology of knowledge, not only
bears tensions inside, but also tends towards
(1) reification of the object world - a
tendency that became fully pronounced with the
triumph of empirical positivism. (2) exaggeration
of the distinction between culture, which was
presumed to be subjective, and social structure,
which was presumed to be objective; and (3) an
increasing bias in research on religion to focus on
3 Wuthnow, R1 ., op.cit.,p.l9
4
the cognitive dimension of religion... 4
The reification of the objective world and the arguments of
the reductionists who took religion as a social phenomenon
beloning to the subjective world, as they were put forward by
Durkheim, Weber and Marx, implied, that over time religion
would be replaced by secular developments. Put differently,
it had been assumed that religion would diminish from the
sacred to the secular in a deterministic, linear and predic-
table process and according to the societal developments as
they were described in the theoretical contexts of each of
these scientists. It goes without saying that according to
this view, there would be an inevitable conflict between
science and religion.
This classical approach to the study of religion had to
undergo serious scrutiny in respect to its deterministic
presuppositions. Secularization, indeed, didn't occur as
predicted; the phenomenon of secularization seemed not to be
as pervasive or irreversible as one had thought it to be.
Modernization and rationalization had not swept away reli-
gion. The opposite development was rather the case; religion
gained in meaning, positivistic methods and views in the
study of religion turned out to lose their infallibility,
and, at the same time, there developed a growing appreciation
4 Wuthnow, R., op.cit. p.20
5
Of the meaning of myths and symbols.
To make a long story short, the wholistic tradition evolved
with the growing realization that deterministic arguments had
failed in their pervasive power and in their prediction of
societal developments.
The nucleus of the wholistic school is to overcome the
subject-object split, which makes religion belong to the
objective world. Hence, religion, as understood from the
wholistic tradition, is conceived as an expression of the
universal quest for meaning of life. With this understanding,
the radical sociologist's argument, that superhuman beings
were "mythologized expressions of the social and natural
world", could be circumvented and, thus, religion be under-
stood as sometning other than a phenomenon of the external,
objective world.
A major assumption of the wholistic school emphasizes the
meaning of symbols, passions, emotions, etc:
Meaning ,... is an attribute of symbolism, inclu-
ding objects, acts, events, and utterances, and is
assumed to be defined by the context in which a
symbol or a set of symbols appears. In short,
meaning is contextual. 3
The meaning of symbols by themselves or in a certain context,
therefore, is supposed to include certain connotations
concerning questions of ultimate concern, contributing to an
3 Wuthnow, R., op.cit., p.20
6
existential "view of the whole". Included are questions
concerning the meaning of life, the ultimate conditions of
existence, and other questions of related concern.
The roots of this school can be traced back to linguistic
studies of Ferdinand de Saussure and Susanne Langer, in which
meanings of words are given by their contexts. Contexts, of
course, vary in their scope and in their comprehensiveness;
the symbolic meaning of the words vary accordingly but,
finally, can result in these questions of ultimate concern
with which religions deal:
In the wholistic tradition, therefore, thedistinct:.^ feature of religious systems came to beidentified as symbolism that attempted to evoke
meanings embracing the whole of reality. 6
Understood from this perspective, religion emancipates one
from a reductionist's attempt to treat religion empirically;
religion is on a different level and cannot be reduced to
what can be understood by empirical investigation.
Secularization, according to this school, is to be understood
quite in a quite different way. Here, symbolic meanings have
to lose their salience and importance for the religious
individual before a secularizing process can take place.
Hence, not religion
,
but the mediators of it, - that is
institutions, groups, and individuals lose their religious
pervasiveness and plausibilty, with the result that the role
6 Wuthnow, R., op.cit., p.24
7
Of religion in an individual's life is moved from, the center
of her/his personal Weltanschauung to the periphery. This
process projected to a societal screen means merely that the
institutions mediating or maintaining religion lose of their
central importance and now occupy another place within
society. The reason for this is that traditional religion has
to compete with other offers of "ultimate meaning systems"’
and "plausibility structures"* which can, in turn, have the
same value in society as, for example, churches have.
Nothing, however, can be determined from this development as
to how far the salience of religion for the religious
believer has changed.
This view is, of course, considerably dependent on the
definition of religion one has in mind as one studies the
change of religion and its significance in modern society.
Hence, the first chapter of the present study deals with the
definitional approaches to the study of religion. Certain
definitions and lines of argumentation in the depiction of
the term religion" are discussed in order to make us aware
of how highly problematic the issue of defining religion is.
One issue, in particular, we will be dealing with is the idea
of the supernatural or superhuman. We do so for several
reasons. First of all, as it would be impossible to discuss
7 Luckmann, T. The Invisible Religion
, New York 1967
8 Berger, P. The Sacred Canopy , New York, 1967
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the entire problematic of defining religion 9
, we shall
concentrate on one issue that is of central interest in the
study of religion. Secondly, we shall deal later on dealing
with two denominations in which the idea of the supernatural
is an axiomatic part; since the conception of a supernatural
being is axiomatic, the basic discussion of it can’t be
false. Thirdly, the supernatural is discussed to learn
something about the scientific, sociological, approach to
such a topic. Finally, the discussion might also provide
information as to what role the belief in a supernatural
being plays in the scientific evaluation of religion.
The various concepts of secularization, analytical approa-
ches, and finally certain features of secularization are the
focus of the following chapter. In its character it is
similar to the previous one, simply because it again elucida-
tes a controversial and ambigious theoretical realm central
to our study. Limits and limitations of the theoretical
concept of secularization and a short review of the previous-
ly debated issues close this second chapter.
In the third chapter, we develop our own analytical model of
secularization, in order to have a methodological basis for
the original question of this study: can, for example, voting
9 Many scientists of the discipline, such as Peter
Berger, consider the definitional question as a minor
problem in the study of religion. Perhaps they are
right. However, even if the question is of marginal
interest, we shall at least consider a sketchy outline
of the question as a helpful basis for a further
discussion of secularization.
9
decisions be used as an indicator of secularization ?
The attempt to answer such a question requires both a
knowledge of religions and religious institutions in a
society, and, equally important, an understanding of the
political parties that represent the politcal interests in
this society. The latter aspect, however, is only discussed
in its linkage to religion. The society we are looking at
will be that of the Federal Republic of Germany.
After asking the question, we try to answer it with two
examplary studies closely related to our question. The tables
we are using are the outcome of the statistcal methods
applied. In the first case there has been a logit-regression
analysis, in the second an age-group-analysis. This informa-
tion is essential, because both methods, though based on 1982
aggregate data analyses, are commonly acknowledged to allow
at least some indications of an analysis over time possible.
And this is, indeed, what we need if we want to show any
traces of secularization at all.
Finally a review of our findings closes our study. In the
concluding chapter
,
we discuss once again the question
whether voting behavior can at all be used as an indicator of
secularization.
10
Definitional and Analytical Problems of Religion
More than all other disciplines of the social sciences, the
sociology of religion is characterized by a controversial and
diffuse definitional discussion about the very object of
research. The reason for this problem is twofold; on the one
hand, the sociology of religion per se has no cohesive
theoretical background and is therefore in need of a close
description and definition of the subject. On the other hand,
however, there is also the topic "religion", which, in
itself, is a term that can be defined in various ways from
various points of view. Thus definitional approaches are made
from, for example, a theological, anthropological, and
philosophical as well as from a sociological side. In
general, each deals with some important aspect of the study
of religion; but they are not interchangable in terms of
their theoretical character as they try to analyze and
explain the religious phenomenom, and even if their approa-
ches are similar, their goals of explanation are quite
different. This can be related to purely terminological prob-
lems, insofar as identical terms used in the several approa-
ches simply have different connotations. To find a common and
completely unproblematic basis for defining the object of
research is in this context thus simply not possible.
11
In What follows ar-,-, J -i .„e are not dealing with the historical
development of the study of religion in one or the other
scientific discipline. Also, we don’t want to illuminate the
function of religon as a help in finding the meaning of life,
project which might rather be a theological or even
Philosophical question concerning religion. Nevertheless we
need a starting point we can base our argument on, in this
case, an argument concerned with a problem, that is more or
less a sociological, and to some extent an anthropological,
one. The following discussion is therefore focused on the
more significant definitions of religion from a sociological
aspect, though it contains, not only purely sociological, but
also, framed in the sociological context, various anthropolo-
gical aspects to the definitional question.
This focus needs further explanation. To us it seems that
dealing with the role religion plays in society, that is, the
function, influence, validity religion has in society
not to forget about the impact it has on society - is not
the province of only one particular discipline. Dealing,
however
,
with the character of religion and its societal role
in respect to cultural, historical, sociological and social
importance, we shall particularly address the sociology and
the anthropology of religion. The theoretical borders between
even these two disciplines, however are quite fluid. Each has
contributed to the definitional approaches of the other.
But before we concentrate more deeply on this problem,
12
several terms, which are used frequently in the scientific
definitional discussion, should be presented in at least in
their basic meaning. In this preliminary discussion we can
expect to clarify several aspects for the further discussion
of religion later on. 10
Dichotomous Terms of Definition
Most definitions of religion represent a couple of termino-
logical dichotomies. Basically they can be divided into
nominal and real definitions. Nominal definitions try to
describe every possible outcome and development of religious
behaviour and phenomena. They can be imagined as a kind of
multivariant formula, in which the concrete religious
phenomena have to be put to define and explain the character
and form of the appropriate religion. As can be observed,
those definitions or descriptions of religion are sometimes
extremely abstract and most of them are highly arbitrary.
They bear, therefore, the danger that they cover too many
forms and too many aspects of religion. The accurate adumbra-
tion of a particular realm can thereby easily get lost in the
search for generality. Nevertheless nominal definitions are
often used, since they can be applied to almost every problem
10 We refer here, as we discuss the different terms, to
Roland Robertson's book The Sociological Interpreta-
tation of Religion , Oxford, 1970.
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long as there exists already a cohesive theoretical
framework which they can be based on.
Real definitions cover those descriptions of religion which
try to deal with all empirical data and phenomena of religion
and, in addition, with the unique and singular facts of
religious belief systems. Those definitions are based on some
already accepted proposition about some relgious aspect or
phenomenom and are, of course, limited in their application
as well as in terms of the realm they try to define.
The application of these two types of definition depends
strongly on the aspect of religion one wants to discuss while
dealing with sociological questions of religion. The systema-
tic and scientific approach to religion, however, requires an
accurate definition of religion; too general a definition is
therefore hardly useful.
Another important dichotomy is the distinction between broad-
inclusive and restrictive-exclusive types of definition of
religion
.
Broad or inclusive definitions interpret the term religion as
not neccessarily linked with supernatural, ritual or con-
fessional criteria they include in their definition political
ideologies such as, for example, communism or fascism, and
the like. A prominent representative of this definitional
approach is J. Milton Yinger, who understands communism as a
form of religion, too.
If one desires to apply the former destinction of nominal and
14
real definitions to the second dichotomy, broad or inclusive
definitions surely fit in the nominal category.
Restrictive or exclusive definitions are, accordingly, real
definitions. They are characterized by a more narrow or
accurate form of defining religion sociologically. Dealing
more with the relationship of religious beliefs to other non-
religious societal organizations or institutions, as well as
with the impact of the latter on the first and vice versa,
they exclude belief systems like communism from their
definitional frame for the term religion.
A third dichotomy is the division between functional and
substantive types of definition. One can almost derive the
meaning of this division from the general meaning of the
terms used in making it.
A functional definition of religion looks for the phenomena
of a belief system, identifies them and investigates the
actual functions of these phenomena in the societal or poli-
cultural or historical, or whatsoever system to which
they belong. The character of these definitions is not
neccessarily restrictive. Here, to stick to the communism-
example, political ideologies understood more or less as
religions are not excluded from a functional definition of
religion. Judging merely from their functions, one could well
argue that even political ideologies are religions because
they certainly fulfill some sets of appropriate functions
within a system.
15
The substantive definition concentrates more on the actual
contents, or better the substance of a belief system. The
focus of this type of definition is not on the functions a
belief system in general fulfills, but on the actual main
features of religion in particular, the distinction between
political and religious commitment, the existence of superna-
tural beings or symbols, and also the social, sociological,
cultural, political functions and consequences of religion
the society.
Comparing those main features after such an analysis to a
entirely political ideology, one could indeed argue that a
political ideology has some religous features. Then, of
course, one has to ask whether this is understood from a
broad-inclusive or res tictive-exclusive definitional point of
view. The point to make here, however, is that even with the
distinction between a functional and a substantive definition
a re ligion cannot be unambigiously described without the
additional help of other definitional limitations. In any
case, a belief system analyzed in this way would then be
called a functional equivalent of religion.
Functional equivalent is also a term within the definitional
debate. It combines some features of the functional-substan-
tive dichotomy and is therefore also used in the sociological
analysis of religion. It takes parts of both the functional
and substantive features into account when a belief system of
any kind is analyzed. Depending on the perspective, one might
16
decide to call the belief system being analyzed a religion
or not. To call it a functional equivalent is to imply that
it is a non-religious system which functions are generally
equal to those of a religion. How one could differentiate
between those true religions and mere functinal equivalents,
will be another, later, focus within this discussion of
defintional and analytical problems of religion.
A term we have used up to this point but what has not been
explained yet, is the expression "belief system". We agree
with Melford E. Spiro, who explains this term, stressing the
importance of an additional variable in the belief in super-
natural beings
, as follows:
...Beliefs concerning the existence and attributes
of these beings, and of the efficacy of certain
types of behaviour (ritual, for example) ininfluencing their relations with man constitute abelief system
.
1
1
Since we agree basically with Spiro’s definition of religion,
as well, his argumentation will be discussed extensively in
turn
.
11 Spiro, Melford E., "Religion: Problems of Definition
and Explanation", in: Banton, Michael (ed.) Anthro-
poligical Approaches to the Study of Religion
London, 1966
17
Definitional Models of Relio-inn
We have already mentioned that our concern is of both an
anthropological and a sociological nature. In refering to
anthropology we mean that discipline of anthropology which
deals in particular with the inquiry into social phenomena
like religion. If we talk about sociology, we think of those
parts of it which deal with religion as a sociological
phenomenon that is to be analyzed and explained. Here it
would mean that we want to use the entire discipline, the
sociology of religion with all its various approaches to the
subject. That, of course, we would like to do. But to do so,
would burst the bounds of this work.
Other approaches to religion, such as the theological and the
philosophical, we would like to bypass in our particular
concern as far as this is posssible, for several reasons. It
should be mentioned, however, that we are very well aware of
the important contributions these two apporaches have made to
the study of religion. But, for one thing, as both the
theological and the philosophical approaches elaborate on
religion, not all of them place their focus directly on the
social function and influence of religion. That means if we
would like to discuss to what extent religion influences
political behaviour as well as social change, it would be
wrong to use them for this purpose. Hence, to use an appro-
18
priate definitional background, but also for the sake of
brevity, we stress our interest in the definitional models of
religion, on the social anthropologist’s and, if their are
decisive differences, on the sociologist’s perspective on
religion
.
even if we restrict ourselves in this rigorous fashion,
we cannot omit Max Weber’s approach to the study of religion.
Since we do not want to compare the classical apporaches of
Weber and Durkheim - the reason for this is nothing but our
feeling that we can't sufficiently discuss the giantic
influence both scientists had on the study of religion, our
stress for the time being is put on Weber’s general concep-
tion of the development of religion. Then, after that, we
shall discuss a scientist who stands strongly in the Weberian
tradition, Melford E. Spiro. We do this, because Spiro on the
one hand represents, as has been mentioned, Weber's approach,
and on the other hand, not only clearly deviates from
Durkheim 's understanding on the essential point of a belief
in a supernatural being, but also echoes our own general
understanding of religion.
According to Weber
,
there was a point of common origin of
all religious development, a general primitive religion. By
more and more developing differentiation, different forms and
types of religion developed. The essential motivation for
this differentiation is not an applied rationalization of the
primitive religion, but an abnormal, exceptional event. This
19
event is conceived as the realization of the difference
between secular and relgious phenomena. Up to thus point,
this distinction could not have been made clear within the
primitve religion. Religious events, starting from this
special event, differentiate from secular in respect to the
quality of the religious event ( forces, attitudes and
virtues) which are understood as being exceptional, special.
Weber calls the extraordinary quality of such an event
charisma 1 2 From this charisma, Weber argues, can easily
arise a conception of a supernatural world in contrast to the
ordinary daily life. How this supernatural world is under-
stood - conceptions of entities and their relation to the
actual world - is a matter of imagination. An individual
person might conceive such an entity as a soul, whereas in
public such entities are understood as gods or demons. A
imagination that transforms the entities into god or demons
is made possible by either a magical or a secular influence
e.g. by a particular creed of a magician that is accepted by
his followers or, by a "secular chieftain" (Weber) who
applies divine features to a dead ancestor or hero:
What is primarily distinctive in this whole
development is not the personality, impersonality
or superpersonality of these supernatural powers,
12 Talcott Parsons observes a striking similarity among
Durkheim's term sacre and Weber's term charisma.
Parsons , Talcott
,
The Structure of Social Action
,
2nd. edition Glencoe, 111. 1949, particularly
chp.17, p . 640-686
20
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Symbolic activities imply the question of meaning, because
one wants to know the meaning of this symbolic action. The
symbols or symbolic action
, as Weber argues, by and large
sweep away the naturalistic aspects of the traditional
religion. For this process, the rationalization, a general
interpreter of the new religion, which had possibly swept
away some of the major features of the traditional religion,
is needed. Max Weber calls this interpreting process "prophe-
cy", and the person acting analogously a "prophet". Two types
of prophets are determined by Weber. The ethical type of
prophet feels himself as an instrument of the divine will and
tries to teach the way to salvation ( Jesus, Mohammed ). The
exemplary type of prophet feels himself as the personified
way of life to salvation (Buddha)
. Here we have arrived at a
point, where an important problem in the definition of
religion is touched, the idea of a supernatural being. For
the time being, it is sufficient to note that Max Weber
understands religion as a human phenomenon, including the
belief in a superhuman being in various forms, which can be,
13 Weber, Max, The Sociology of Religion
, transl.by
E.Fischoff, Boston 1956, p.6
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nevertheless, reduced to the two types of prophet. it is
important to note that all this rationalization, the develop-
ment of new values, is not given in a merely ad hoc fashion
the stage of the primitve religion, but is part of a
cultural, " this-worldly
" process.
However, we do not want to leave Weber's argumentation per se
without a point most crucial to the study of religion.
Vrijhof has pointed ouf< that Max Weber, taking religion as
a human phenomenon rather than a social phenomenon! as other
scientists did, is, with his approach, solely outside of the
hermeneutic circle. This circle makes it impossible for the
recent sociology of religion to answer one of its most
important questions without the help of other, philosophical
or theological approaches. Let us see why this is so.
Religion understood as a social phenomenom, bears, it is
commonly acknowledged, an integrational function. The
question arises, consequently, how that integrative function
can be explained. Can it be explained by the contents of a
religion or by the special structure of the religious
community ( "Gemeinde
" , as Weber calls it) and the particular
relationship between its members ? This is the crucial point
of either return or no return; if the question is answered
14 Vrijhof, Pieter H. " Was ist Religionssoziologie ?"
in:"Probleme der Religionssoziologie", Kolner Zeit -
schrift fur Sozioloqie und Sozialpsycholoqie
, ed. by
Rene Koenig, special issue No . 6 , 2nd edition, Cologne
1966, p . 10-35
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positively, then one may ask whether this integration is to
be understood religiously as belonging to religious phenome-
na. If, however, this question is answered negatively, then
one cannot explain how the integrative function of religion
is to be determined.
Max Weber is outside this hermeneutic circle, as Vrijhof
observes
:
Be
j
Max Weber fehlt die explizite Frages tellungnach dem Wechselverhal tnis von Religion und Gesell?schaft. Er sieht als Soziologe die 'Sinndeutung des
T?
Z1
^
len Hande lns’ als vornehmste Augabe an...Re-ligios Oder magisch motiviertes Handeln ist inseinem urwiichsigen Bestande diesseitig ausge-
richtet... Max Weber will den Einfluss der Religion
nicht verstehen als Auswirkung einer ubernaturli-
chen Gegebenheit auf Mensch und Gesellschaft
sondern als menschliche Sinndeutung des Obernatur-lichen, das er als solches au(3erhalb der Betrach-tung bela3 t
.
1
5
Having discussed one of the most important points in the
sociology of religion from Weber's perspective, we now look
at the contrast between one scientist in the Weberian
tradition, Melford E. Spiro, and Emile Durkheim's views of the
supernatural. This comparsion meets two goals at one time;
first, the difference between a classical (most influential)
approach and recent one becomes obvious; secondly, a central
question in the sociology of religion, the idea of the
supernatural, will be discussed.
13 Vrijhof , Pieter H
.
, op . ci t
. ,
p . 11
23
We have already agreed with Melford Spiro's- definition of a
belief system. He disagrees with Emile Durkheim 's” defini-
tion of religion even in some basic elements. Those diffe-
rences are to be discussed first before we take up Spiro's
own descriptions and explanations.
There is, to begin with, the most crucial difference in the
question whether a religion is to be characterized by the
belief in supernatural beings, as Durkheim calls them, or
not. Durkheimian supernatural beings are:
...all sorts of things which surpass the limits ofour knowledge; the supernatural is the world of the
mysterious, of the unknowable, of the un-under-
standable
.
1 8
For Durkheim, the idea of the existence of a supernatural
being is a artefact of men's inability to cope with things he
hasn’t yet been able to explain. If one agrees that the
phenomena of the universe are based on certain laws, one
cannot, simply because one doesn't understand certain
phenomena, explain them by appealing to the existence of
supernatural beings:
16 Spiro, M.E., op.cit., p.85ff
1
' Durkheim, E.
,
The Elementary Forms of Religious Lif
e
,
transl . by. J.W. Swain, New York, 1961, p.37ff
18 Durkheim, Emile, op.cit., p.39
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r ,i • , * xiau ce things are suopmat-nrai
, it is nprpcoavt, *. „ , , , * c p pernatu-
natural orde^r?hLgs° exCits* *
Durkheim argues that the idea of a supernatural being is the
result of the positive sciences a postulate on which
positive sciences reposed”**, and that was thus recently
established and which was proved by their progress. On the
other hand, Durkheim continues, the classical ancient
thinkers had not even been aware of this universial determi-
nism, therefore, the belief in supernatural beings is a
product of at least early modern man. Up to this time any
extraordinary or extra-natural event was taken to be perfec-
tly conceivable. Now, with universial determinism, the belief
in supernatural beings is established and the original
conviction considerably weakened that even abnormal events
are conceivable. This belief in supernatural beings and their
work, as Durkheim argued, originally prevailed in the
sciences. But, while it was abolished in the natural scienes
rather quickly, it was not until recently that it has been
rejected in the social sciences. This is, Durkheim argues,
the reason why this belief is still discussed in the social
sciences, he concludes that "...as far as social facts are
19 Durkheim, Emile, op.cit., p.41
20 Durkheim , Emile
,
op.cit., p.41
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concerned, we still have the mentality of primitives"**.
Concentrating on the belief in supernatural beings in
religion, Durkheim sees this creed acquired not from primi-
tive beliefs but from a few advanced religions. The argument
here is that this belief was not given to man but "...it is
man who forged it, with his own hands along with the contrary
idea" 2 2 Therefore, the belief in supernatural beings cannot
be made a characteristic mark of religious phenomena:
** impossible to make it the characteristic
^
•
rellgi °US phenomena without excluding fromthe definition the majority of the facts to bedefined 2 3
.
Relating to the religions which do not have a belief in
supernatural beings, such as Bhuddism, Durkheim appears to
offer proof as to why a supernatural being can't be a
relevant feature while analyzing religions comparatively and
cross-cul turally 2
4
.
Spiro's opinion concerning the belief in 'superhuman' beings
as he calls them to avoid Durkheim' s (ambigious) word
'supernatural'- is simply the opposite. He argues for the
inclusion of superhuman beings in a definition of religion in
21 Durkheim, Emile , op . ci t
. ,
p . 42
22 Durkheim
, Emile
,
op.cit. p.43
23 Durkheim , Emile
,
op.cit., p.43
24 For a detailed argumentation in this respect see
Durkheim, Emile, op . cit
.
, 45f f
.
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both a methodological and factual way
Spiro understands
By superhuman beings
. . .any beings believed to possess power greater
whose
m
?eht
h0 C
K
n "°rk 9°0d and/or evil on man. and
r lationship with man
influenced 2 3
,
can, to some degree, be
Methodologically he sees no reason why a comparative
religion should be - regardless of superhuman
performed universally. That is, even if there are
which can't be explained or defined by a certain d
of religion, it does not follow that the study of
then loses fascination or validity:
study of
beings-
religions
ef inition
religion
The fact that hunting economies
, unilateral descentgroups, or string figures do not have a universialdistribution has not prevented us from studying
them
^
comparatively... once we free the word
religion' from all value judgements, there is no
reason for dismay nor for elation concerning the
empirical distribution of religion attendant upon
our definition
.
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This is clearly a rejection of Durkheim's design for studying
religion. But it is, as we also feel, a legitimate question,
why a comparative study of religion (something in any case,
which we are not attempting here) has simultaneously to be
universal. In Durkheim's exclusion of superhuman beings as an
2 5 Spiro
,
M . E
.
,
2 6 Spiro
,
M. E
.
,
op . ci t
.
,
op . ci t
.
,
p . 98
p . 88/89
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important indicator of religion, Spiro even sees a restric-
tion in the study of religion. He states that if the study
sets out to analyze a social phenomenon! cross-cul turally
, it
should not be limited in its scope in respect to, as Spiro
calls it, the " intra-cul tural intuivity"
. with that he refers
to a system’s intuivity, e.g. to accepting a belief in the
existence of superhuman beings. But, as we have already
stated, that is exactly what is omitted in the Durkheimian
argumentation as well as in his later, controversial,
universal definition of religion. That means for Spiro, that
a study of religion without the inclusion of superhuman
beings both in the argumentation as well as in a later
definition is not possible27
.
So far we have considered Spiro's discussion from a methodo-
logical point of view; we turn now to the question of factual
adequacy. Factually, Spiro takes Durkheim's Buddhist example
to show that, though not directly, even in the Buddhist
belief system there exist some definite forms of superhuman
beings 28
. Hence he concludes
...the belief in superhuman beings and in their
Spiro argues with respect to the universality of the
comparative sciences that the "..insistence on
universality.
. .is an obstacle to the comparative
method for it leads to continous changes in defini-
tion ... because of their vagueness or abstractness."
Spiro, M.E. op. cit.,p.86
28 For a detailed discussion in this respect see Spiro,
op . ci t
. ,
p . 91-94f
28
power to aid or harm man
the belief systems of all
is a central feature
traditional societies 29
in
He goes on to show that in different religions, Confucianism
as well in Hinduism, Catholicism as well as in Judaism, there
exists a form of superhuman beings. This is so regardless of
whether moral and /or value system has a, to use the Weberian
terms, " this-wordly" or "other-worldly" character. m
brief, regarding the acception or rejection of superhuman, or
in the Durkheimian terminology supernatural, beings Soirounderstands the belief in them as a "core variab?e" which
also shows an almost universial distribution and should thus
...be designated by any kind definition of religion” 30
. In
what way these superhuman beings form part of a given
religion depends on the way they are understood, whether as
means or ends. As a means they may be needed as aids in
reaching a worldly goal. If they are understood in a
religion which has more immaterialis tic
, "other-wordly
"
values, then superhuman beings, according to Spiro's argumen-
tation, are viewed as an ' allconsuming goal’
.
That means it is the appropriate belief itself which charac-
terizes its superhuman beings as objects of Weberian "ulti-
mate concern" (questions which the individual asks in respect
to the meaning of life, or concerning the fact of death) or
whether they are not to be understood as such. As a corrola-
29 Spiro, M.E., op . ci t
. ,
p . 94
30 Spiro, M.E., op.cit. p.94
29
ry, one may add that beliefs needn't k. •r t be in any sense an
ultimate concern".
Secondly, there is another major difference between Durkheim
and Spiro as it has already been noted; it concerns the
general methodological approach or design for the study of
religion. The point needn’t to be repeated here. But it
should be mentioned that research design in the sociology of
religion has changed considerably in scope as well as method
from the earliest work (and Durkheim belongs to this period)
down to the present. 31
Having described the major differences betweeen Durkheim and
Spiro, the latter's understanding and his definition of
religion are now of interest.
Since we do not dare to reflect in soliloquy on Durkheim’
s
distinction between the profane' and the 'sacred' 32
,
we want
to discuss what Spiro has to say about it. We do this
because, first, we believe that he has interpreted it
correctly and, because what Spiro says about Durkheim is of
an essential importance to Spiro's own definition of reli-
gion .
Since beliefs are not neccessarily matters of ultimate
concern, Spiro concludes that a religion must therefore
31 For a review of the development of the sociological
approaches of religion see Luckmann, Thomas,
The Invisible Religion . New York/London, 1967
32 Durkheim , Emile
,
op.cit., p.52- 57
30
relate to those Durkheimian sacred things, while secular
concerns relate to the profane things. In addition he argues
that 'sacred' therefore belongs to beliefs of ultimate
concern, and 'profane' to those of secular, ordinary concern.
Concerns can refer to all kinds of phenomena. The essential
characteristic that distinguishes between religion and non-
religion is whether the belief is of ultimate concern to the
believers and followers of this belief or not. Accordingly,
by definition, everything can be called a belief - esoteric
propositions like e.g. "all possible forms of life will be
transformed into light", as well as materialistic orienta-
tions like the stockmarket, political ideologies like
communism, or even consumatory things like baseball.
All those commitments can be called, as long as they are of
ultimate concern, a belief - but qua definitionem not a
religious belief. They may serve the same functions; if so
they are functional equivalents in the sociological termino-
logy to which we want to stick here. Once again, according to
Spiro, those beliefs cannot be called religious beliefs
because of their reference to profane phenomena, and since
they conversely have no reference to superhuman beings
.
Hence, Spiro has developed the following definition of
religion
:
...an institution consisting of culturally pat-
terned interaction with culturally postulated
superhuman beings. 31
31 Spiro, M.E., op . ci t
. ,
p . 96
31
In this definition occur some terms which need to be ex-
plained for a correct understanding of the entire definition
Undoubtedly the term 'institution™ refers to ™church» in
Durkheim's definition of religion. Spiro himself says this,
explaining that
-...religion is an attribute of social
groups, comprising a part of their cultural heritage"**. This
means that the essential features of a religion count among
the variables of a particular culture and are developed and
accepted in exactly the same "enculturation process" as other
cultural variables. It follows then that
the variables constituting a religious system havethe same ontological status as those of other
cultural systems: its beliefs are normative, its
rituals are collective, and its values prescrip-t”"lT7o33
Instead of Durkheim's "church", Spiro, in his definition,
uses "institution" to mean what Durkheim tried to express
with his terminology. Durkheim had similarily insisted on the
social importance of religion within a group of believers.
One may, perhaps, understand this social importance in terms
of identifying membership or, with reference to the security
of the individual in a group.
32 Spiro, M.E., op
. ci t
. ,
p . 97
33 Spiro, M.E., op.cit.,p.97
32
interaction, in Spiro's definition, is understood in two
ways; firstly. the ter* comprises every action which is
believed to be consistent with the will of the superhuman
bemg. Secondly, it represents all actions which are believed
to be apt to influence and communicate with the superhuman
being. The first aspect represents a value system, which is
established according to the religion taught, again reflec-
ting the putative will of the superhuman being. If both
aspects mingle, the fact is a symbolic action, which is
called ritual.
Superhuman beings and belief system need not be explained
again, since we have already mentioned Spiro's explanations
of these terms during our definitional discussion.
Summing up Spiro’s understanding of religion and his way of
differentiating between religion and other culturally
constituted institutions, a religion contains three main
features, all of which refer to a superhuman being. These are
the belief system, the action system and the value system.
Taking these features seriously into account while one
analyzes a belief, one can determine whether it can be called
a religion or not.
This definition serves us in manifold ways. So far we have
discussed a social anthropologist's views and reflections on
how a religion can be not only defined but also both analyzed
and, as far as this is possible, explained. Spiro has
approached this problem also, as we feel, in an almost
33
sociological fashion, touching the ,ajor sociological
.attars
of concern within the study of religion. Coming originally
from a discipline which has had not too much in common with
sociology in general, he has dealt with one of the sociolo-
gy's most prominent and celebrated representatives, particu-
larly in the sociology of religion, Emile Durkheim.
P to this point, we have dealt with two apparently different
kinds of approach to the study of religion. In fact, however,
both are simultaneously different and similar. They are
different, insofar as Durkheim denies that the belief in a
supernatural or superhuman existence is an essential variable
within the definition of religion. They are, however,
similar, in that Durkheim as a sociologist has approached his
subject from a more anthropological perspective whereas Spiro
as a social anthropologist approaches this realm from a more
sociological perspective. In respect to their differences,
our somewhat latent intention has now to become manifest. In
the discussion so far, we were not simply dealing with diffe-
rences between the approaches of two scientists concerned
with religious phenomena. What we were dealing with here is
m fact that there are two different schools within the study
of religion. One school can be basically recognized as
followers of the substantive definition of religion, or of
the wholistic tradidtion, whereas scientists in the other
school have a functionalistic approach to religion, represen-
ting, hence, the radical sociology-part of the Cartesian,
34
dualis tic tradition.
We have already mentioned, admittedly in only a sketchy way,
the major features of substantive and functional definitions.
We want to complete now our depiction of both types of
definition. While we are looking at the limitations of both
schools and how the approach of each must be supplemented, we
want to restrict ourselves to clarifying those aspects of the
extensive literature on methodological and factual defini-
tions and adding a few remarks relating to our own purpose in
the present study.
The difference between Durkheim and Spiro as we have discus-
sed it here, the superhuman beings, is also the point of
difference between functionalists and subs tantivis ts
. it
depends on how one regards religion in respect to those
superhuman beings. If one is interested in religion tout
court, and so in including the belief in superhuman beings,
then one must deal with the meaning content of this phenome-
non. This is the substanive basis, the fundamental proposi-
tion of the one school. If one, however, understands religion
as an encounter with a superhuman being, then the sociology
of religion as a human science can deal only with observable
aspects of religion, according to the dualism of the subjec-
tive world and the objective world, and the consequences
which evolve out of them. This is the argumentation of the
functionalist school.
Paul Berger sums up both goals as follows:
35
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It follows from this functionalistic proposition, that one
must analyze observable aspects of religion and concentrate
on the functions, conditions and effects a religion might
have on the individual and on society. But as a superhuman
being is not empirically observable, functionalistic defini-
tions of religion simply can’t make superhuman beings a core
variable of their definitions. On the other hand, those
definitions therefore fail to distinguish between religious
and non-religious belief systems. This can be easily seen,
since empirically, given the search for "answers to the
problems of meaning"*?, a belief in superhuman beings or the
rejection of it does not influence the results of empirical
observations
.
36 Berger, Peter L., Some Second Thoughts on Sub-
stantive versus Functional Definitions of Religion,
Journal f or the Scientific Study of Religion
Vol.13, No. 2, June 1974, p.l24ff
37 Parsons, Talcott, "The Social System", London 1952,
p.367
36
The critics of functionalism, like Ernest Nagel, see too many
mechanical analogies in the explanations of functionalists.
Those analogies disregard the aspects of human behaviour
which are not always predictable.
The followers of a substantive definition of religion, like
Peter Berger, claim that the scientific study of religion
...must bracket the ultimate truth claims implied
y its subject. This is so regardless of one'sparticular conceptions as to scientific methodologyfor instance, as between
' humanistic positivisticconceptions of science. 38
or
Berger's argument is directly linked to the inability of the
functionalists to distinguish religion from non-religion, due
to their own definitional understanding of the study of
religion. His own approach to religious phenomena is the
Weberian way of understanding "from within". Berger sees the
methodological line of demarcation in the question by which
the researcher wants to find out the "...understanding and
location of these religious meanings within human experi-
ence" 39
. In dealing with this question the methodological
differences of subs tantivis ts and functionalists emerge.
Berger's own approach as a subs tstantivist of the wholistic
tradition is based on, as he calls it, "...the fundamental
'humanistic' proposition that the world is essentially a
38 Berger, Peter L., op.cit., p.125
39 Berger, Peter, op.cit., p.126
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network of meanings and that, therefore, nothing in this
world can be adequately understood without understand^ of
these "from within" 40
Berger formulates a critique which before him was repeatedly
articulated by various scientists reflecting on functiona-
lism. According to this critique there is a danger that the
functional approach can serve for "quasi-scientif ic legitima-
tions of a secularized world view" by avoiding the detailed
specificity, while religious phenomena are equated to other,
secular phenomena. Thereby, the nature of religious phenomena
gets lost; the equation or comparison gains validity.
Finally, secular commitments have the same value and meaning
as religion. Then religion is analyzed in the same way as
adequate secular phenomena are, that is, merely in terms of
social and psychological functions, leaving out transcenden-
tal aspects of religion.
The functionalists (we take J. Milton Yinger as a prominent
representative) find aspects to criticize within the substan-
tive approach to definition. In regard to his own sometimes
controversial definitions of religious phenomena, Yinger
states two points which have led him to different judgments
on apparently the same objects. Firstly, the line separating
religion from non-religion can't be generally determined.
Whereas a given distinction might fit well in some situations
with certain conditions, it might simply not fit reasonably
4 0 Berger, Peter, op.cit., p.126
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in a similar case with almost the same ch
Secondly, Yinger explains, while he has made
ain things, he has taken contemporary
fundamental measure of consideration. There he
the understanding of a supernatural being has
rentiated, sometimes even vague:
aracter is tics
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ng criterion becomes problematic.The difficulty becomes even more serious, if one isseeking to develop a theory of religion thatencompasses both types of societies. 41
This quotation expresses the major functionalist critique of
the substantive approach. It implies that a supernatural
being is not enough to differentiate generally or in all
cases correctly, a religion from a non-religion. It implies
also that in our contemporary society the supernatural is
sometimes so diffuse and vague, that the supernatural can't
be any longer an essential criterion, because it has de-
veloped in different types, forms and connotations. Finally,
Yinger s critique points to the problem posed by a contem-
41 Yinger, Milton, J. "The Scientific Study of Religion",
London 1970, p.13
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porary society in that it has developed in so many different
ways, that it eludes simple generalizations. Here again he
borders for the supernatural as a core variable in
definitions of religion. A definition which tries to adum-
brate religion in a sufficiently complex society, obviously
can't include the supernatural.
Without working in a circular fashion, we want, at this
point, to remark on something which Spiro has already
mentioned ; we will do so, because we are convinced that
Yinger knows this argument, since he himself quotes from
Spiro. Our argument, simply put, is the following: if there
are, which we do not doubt, many different forms of beings
said to be supernatural, or many diff erent , seemingly contra-
dictory, or excessively vague, connotations of the term
supernatural", does that mean that supernatual beings simply
do not exist ? Or, does it mean, because allegedly superna-
tural beings are so varied and the connotations of the term
"supernatural" are so diverse, that it is not worthwhile
defining a whole study with reference to it ?
We have ended up at this point with a variety of questions.
But we want to note the following provisional considerations:
Be they as developed and differentiated as can be, the
theoretical and definitional approaches to the study of
religion divide, due to their basic theoretical differences,
on the question of the connotation and operat ionlaization of
the supernatural.
40
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- Neither approach excludes the other; they may therefore be
used simultaneously if this helps to reach the goal of a
study. Or, as Wuthnow evaluates this matter:
Because of their limitations as directives forempirical research, phenomenology and hermeneuticscame to serve the study of religion primarUy as atheoretical rationale for the importance andnonreducibility of religion, while the dualistic
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42 Wuthnow, R., op.cit., p.23
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Towards an Expedien t Definition of Rpl-iq-ior.
Having, to a limited extent, completed the definitional
discussion, we now have to recall the goal of our study. Then
we must decide which major aspects of religion we are dealing
with and afterwards determine which of the two approaches, or
both, or parts of both, we want to use. That it is methodo-
logically legitimate to combine these approaches we want to
support with a few reflections from scientists within the
discipline we have already mentioned.
The goal of the present study is to analyze some aspects of
the impact religion has on political behaviour of the
individual within a society. The society to be looked at is
that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Christian
belief, Judaism and Islam prevail the entire continent of
Europe. The Federal Republic belongs to those societies that
can t properly be analyzed with Yinger's disinction of two
forms of society. What frustratres the application of Yinger
is that there is both the universal belief in supernatural
beings and a modern urban society within which a diffuse and
vague concept of these supernatural beings exists. Hence
Yinger's functional approach, because it does not contain an,
in this case essential, variable, cannot be properly applied.
Yet the functional approach is important for our study, since
42
we want to loo* for the consonances of region in respect
to political behaviour - clearly a point which might properly
approached functionalistically.
But to understand a behaviour that might be influenced by a
religious belief in a superhuman being, we need to understand
it from inside
. That, however, means that we need the
substantive approach such as Berger has used, since we find
here the missing variable, the belief in a superhuman being,
included in this approach. As a matter of fact, therefore, we
need bits of both approaches. It seems, therefore, as if we
are forced to construct our own, individual definition of
religion. Is this scientifically legitimate ?
According to Berger,
...definitions are always ad hoc
They don't fall from heaven. They
cognitive purpose. To some extent,
are a matter of taste. 43
constructions
.
have a specific
definitions are
Hence we may think of our own purposive definition. We have
already discussed the terminology, we are aware of the major
problems of defining religion scientifically, and we know of
the two different scientific approaches to the study of
religion. Therefore, as we do not dare to formulate a defini-
tion of religion from scratch, we simply intend to paraphrase
our purposive definition of religion as follows.
We agree with Spiro and Berger (hence with Weber, too) that
43 Berger, Peter, op.cit., p.127
43
the belief in a supernatural being is essentially important
for the definition of religion. We do so for two reasons.
Firstly, it simultaneously facilitates the distinction
between religion and non-religion, and it narrows the object
Of the study clearly. Secondly, we will be dealing with a
society within which, though there are a variety of religious
beliefs, the belief in some supernatural being or the other
is universal.
In addition, we generally agree with Spiro's definition of
religion, which pays also attention to the cultural aspect of
religion as it has been described and defined in the belief
system, value system and action system.
From the functionalist approach we take over the analysis of
the impact, function and consequence of religion into our own
definitmal understanding of religion. This might be a poor,
or only small, contribution to our study, but we are convin-
ced that we simply can't accept more without losing some of
the elementary functionalistic features as described by
Yinger as follows:
Functional investigation focuses on those intra-
system processes in which a product of the system
helps to maintain it by reducing or eliminating
otherwise destructive processes. Or perhaps it
would be better to say that functional investiga-
tion is a study of the degree to which a product of
the system serves to maintain it, full attention
being paid to the balance of support and costs. 44
44 Yinger, Milton J., op.cit., p.93
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We are not focusing on the degree to which religion helps to
maintain a system, nor on the '•balance of support and costs".
We feel, therefore, that we have to restrict our functional
element within the definition of religion to the above
mentioned extent.
Describing finally the character of our definition of
religion as we have it introduced here, we can say that ours
is a real, restrictive-exclusive, partly functional and
partly substantive, definition of religion. A purposive
definitional basis for our further study is thus both
scientifically and legitimately completed.
This has been, perhaps, only a partial discussion of the
definitional problematic; nevertheless we think that it
serves our purposes as a background information for a
discussion of the theoretical concept of secularization,
which we want to focus on, in turn.
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CHAPTER II
SECULARIZATION
: CONCEPTS, FORMS, AND PHENOMENA
Theoretical Prepropositions
An important theoretical concept concerning the role of
religion within social change is called secularization. The
term itself can be explicitly traced back into the middle
ages. In 1648 the term "secularization" occured in the text
of the Peace of Westphalia transferring church property into
the property of the German Princes. During and after the
French Revolution it was used in the same connotation but in
a more aggressive, politically motivated and enforced,
program to expropriate the church's real estate and other
precious goods.
By and large, secularization came to be understood not only
in this rather materialistic sense but also as an expression
of a negation of religious moral values, concerning e.g. the
conduct of life, social behavioral conventions, etc. In other
words, the term was used to show a more and more increasing
emanicpation from the church's social and moral implications
and controls within the life of the individual and the
society in toto. It is important to distinguish between (1)
secularism understood as the reflection of an anti-religious
program, and (2) secularization as the reflection of a
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neutral attitude towards religious traditions .<
*
Though the distinction between secularism and secularization
is reasonably clear, the sociological connotation of the
latter is neither unique nor at all precise. Weber and
Troeltsch took it as a descriptive and analytical term, yet
the term's location within sociological theories isn't yet
determined. There are at least five different concepts of
secularization 4
6
.
Concepts of Secularization
Secularization can accordingly be conceived, first, as a
decline of religion. Religious institutions, doctrines and
values that once prevaled lose their general validity and
importance. The final state of religion, it is assumed, is a
highly isolated or
,
to a large extent, marginally differen-
tiated and institutionalized one.
Secularization may be conceived, secondly, as a process of
conformity with the world. Religious groups de-emphasize to a
certain extent their focus on the supernatural and orient
themselves more to the social world surrounding them. The
question here, however, is to what extent this tendency is to
43 Shiner, Larry " The Meanings of Secularization ",
International Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion ,
Vol.3, 1967, p. 51-60
46 Shiner, Larry, op.cit.; See there for a much more
detailed discussion both of the implications and
theoretical roots of these five different concepts.
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world and
be understood as an
' aggiornamento
' to the secular
to what extent it is to be understood as part of the reli-
gious tradition itself, perhaps a part which has not been
emphasized much previously but which is indeed a form of
secularization. Both guestions can be used to evaluate this
process toward secular conformity and decline. However, the
empirical proof of answers that might be offered to each of
these questions is difficult. Talcott Parsons gave an
alternative solution in respect of the decline - conformity
debate. Parsons suggested substituting the term seculariza-
tion with differentiation. This replacement makes it possible
to conceive religion simultaneously from inside and outside
the debate. Conceived from outside, religion merely shifted
its location within a highly complex and differentiated
world. By transfering some of the roles it had in former
times to other, secondary, institutions, religion has not
necessarily lost or given up any of its major roles (confor-
mity) nor has it basically lost any of its most important
meaning for the individual or for the society (decline)
. When
religion is conceived from inside the debate, followers of
both propositions use Parsons' suggestion as support for
their theories. The point Parsons wanted to make is simply
outside this debate. That is, western religious traditions
needn't neccessarily be considered as being 'disintegrated'
as long as they are conceived as having shifted their
location within modern society.
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secularization may be conceived, thirdly, as the desacraliza-
tion of the world. The individual's as well as the society's
View of the world is subject to change due to the development
Of rational and causal explanation and descriptions, what
were formerly miracle or mystic images, coloured by whatever
kind of explanation, lose their power to convince. Religious
meaning and teachings are also seen in this secular light and
lose appropriately in their sacral connotations. The final
state according to this concept of secularization is a
perfectly rational world, without any belief in a supernatu-
ral being or in mystery.
Secularization can be thought of, fourthly, as the disengage-
ment of society from religion. The complete withdrawal of
religion from its societal roles and its limitation of the
private sector is the final state of religion under this
concept. Also, religion is conceived in this final state as
having entirely no influence beyond the borders of the
religious parish, not even in the decision-making processes
or the social behavior of individuals or of corporate bodies
or of institutions. Hence two different forms of this concept
are apparent: the intellectual-existential and, appropriate-
ly, the institutional-social plane.
The fifth form of secularization is the transposition of
beliefs and patterns of behavior from the religious' to the
social sphere. In contrast to the disengagement concept, in
which secular institutions were conceived as a consequence in
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modern society of both secular and religious development as
well, the transpository concept conceives the institution's
developmental heritage as stemming from a former sacral
context or tradition. Here, the culminating state of society
would be the transposition of all former functions of
religion by society, and a religion that is understood
anthropologically. The difficulty with the transposition
concept is almost the same as in the decline-conformity
debate; firstly, it is very difficult to offer evidence as to
how far transmigrations and survivals of religious origins
into modern society have taken place. Secondly, even after
one has succeded in collecting some evidence on this matter,
one has not answered the question as to what extent the
analysed phenomenon has a genuinely religious background;
whether it is, in addition, a purely Christian tradition or
some other, or even a mixture of religions within the same
cultural circle; or, finally, whether the observed phenomenon
is of some completely other origin, having taken over some
features of a religion.
Having debated five different concepts. Shiner concludes that
a term with so many different connotations, simul taenously
overlapping and distinct, should be abolished in the sociolo-
gical context. He finds support in this respect from Trutz
Rendtorf
f
4
7
,
who states that it is only reasonable to use the
47 Rendtorf f, Trutz "Zur Sakularisierungsproblematik"
International Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion ,
Vol.2, 1966, p . 61
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secularization concept analytically and then only to a very
limited extent. The secularization concept can be used then
only for a descriptive analysis of a society at a certain
point in time, appropriate as an analytical tool within a
sociological research process. It does not help us explain or
predict social phenomena.
The different concepts can be basically divided into two
groups, depending on which definitional approach to religion
one uses. The functionalists tend to conclude that religion
changes its location and manifestation in society (Parsons),
whereas those scientists using a substantive definition
expect a decline in the importance and significance of
religion in the modern world. Hence, each of the five
concepts we have discussed briefly can be evaluated in this
respect. However, since it is not our goal to discuss the
right ordering of these concepts, we want to end our discus-
sion of them here at the risk of being incomplete. Moreover,
before we concentrate especially on the societal implications
of secularization, we shall take a look at another theoreti-
cal problem - the problem of levels of analysis.
Levels of Analysis
It is not only the definitional approach to religion that
makes secularization nominally and connotatively ambigious,
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analysis. Dobbelaere 4
0
has
but also the different levels of
discus four different scientists, two of the, working on
the basis of the social definition paradigm (Berger, Luok-
,ann, the other two on the basis of the social fact paradigm
(Wilson, Luhmann)
. The difference between them is that
scientists using the first paradigm are interested in the
engagement of human beings within the process of creating and
maintaining social facts that are conceived to be coercive,
Whereas scientists following the latter paradigm just analyse
those coercive social facts and their impact on humanity.
Discussing both paradigms thoroughly, Dobbelaere observes,
first, not only that the social definition paradigm works on
the cultural and individual level of analysis, whereas, by
contrast, the social fact paradigm rather focuses on organi-
zations - their role structures - and the social system and
its various subsystems. In addition, Dobbelaere seeks for a
theoretical element appropriate to link both paradigms. With
this linkage, it should be possible to arrive at an even more
cohesive and comprehensive knowledge in the sociological
study of religion. Along with the features these two para-
48 Dobbelaere, Karel "Secularization Theories and
Sociological Paradigms: A Reformulation of the
Private-Public Dichotomy and the Problem of Societal
Integration", Sociological Analysis . Vol.46, No 4
1985, p.377ff.
This can be no means be a thorough discussion of
Dobbelaere' s article. Here, we stress our interest on
the theoretical problems and limitations of the
secularization theory in the broadest sense, focusing
on questions which are immediately related to our own
study
.
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digms have in common (the two-dimensional object q£
the societal level as well as the change in religion
itself, the similiar though not identical societal level of
analysis
, and at last the proposition of a functional
differentiation of society both paradigms use)
, the crucial
difference between them becomes obvious as well- uw^ xu ; it concerns
the discussion of the public and private sphere.
The major problem for both paradgims is the private sphere.
In limiting their understanding of secularization entirely to
the idea of a funtional rationalization, something that takes
Place particularly in the public sphere, Berger and Luck-
mann<* bypass the actions that occur in the subsystems of
society. In contrast, Wilson’- has shown that the seculari .
zing process is not limited to the public sphere but is to be
observed in the private sphere as well. In addition, he has
demonstrated that the private sphere and its motivation are
quite relevant for the public secular process of functional
rationalization. Since Berger and Luckmann merely conceive
the public as opposite to the private sphere and, moreover,
concentrate in particular on the former, they leave out an
important factor in their analysis, and hence their analysis
remains both incomplete and inaccurate.
49 Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social
Construction of Reality
. New York 1966
Also: Berger, Peter L., The Sacred Canopy
, New York
1969, p,107ff.
Wilson, Bryan, Religion in the Sociological Perspec~
tive, Oxford 1982, p.166
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Though it is not correct to speak of a simple dichotomy
between private and public spheres, these spheres are
referred to as if they were objective structural elements of
society. Thus, for example, it appears to be easy, in
particular for politicians, to separate, properly and
apparently legitimately, the public from the private sphere.
Since these spheres are, however, to be understood as social
definitions and by no means as social facts, another point to
criticize in the work of Berger and Luckmann is that they
make a de facto switch of paradigms, leaving their analysis
behind m a distorting, confusing and misleading manner.
Dobbelaere concludes, having discussed some other, more
detailed aspects of Luckmann 1 s analysis, that both Berger and
Luckmann went wrong in taking social definitions as structu-
ral features of modern society. The reason this has happened
is that the two scientists made an analysis of social
definitions instead of a structural analysisof society. Had
they offered the latter, Dobbelaere is convinced, they would
have arrived, as Luhmann 3
1
did, at completely different,
correct interpretations, not only of the private and public
sphere but also of the related terms of individuation of
religion and the individuation of decisions.
Since in a modern civic society people cannot be simply
assigned to particular segments of society, as was the case
31 Luhmann, N.
,
Funktion der Religion
, Frankfurt/Main,
1977
54
ln f°rmer timeS
- the dividual has access to all possible
subsystems
. (This is the concept of inclusion- There
,
again, a differentiation takes place in terms of the func-
tions an individual can assume in this subsystem. As every-
body is eligible to perform these functions, specialization
occurs. Complementary roles for a single individual are
possible, and even neccessary, since there is the posssibili-
ty of simultaneous membership in different societal subsys-
tems. That means, for example, that one can be at the same
time an officer in one subsystem and a mere member in
another. Since, however, the separation of these two roles is
difficult to control and to maintain, the individuation of
decisions serves as a functional equivalent:
Through the
. individuation of decisions a statisti-
uM^neUtrallZa^°n . ° f certain role -combinations
,
which are possible in complementary roles, is aimed
at. Such combinations should only
personal level, otherwise thet
occur at the
-
.
. ,
would destroyfunctional differentiation, and hold only for
micro-motives
.
9 3
From this point of view, it is clear that (1) individuation
is not a private matter but a structural consequence of
modern society and (2) secularizing processes occuring on the
Inclusion can also be understood, however, in another
way. On a societal basis, it would mean that, besides
religion, other subsystems also exist. Religion has
given up some of its genuine functions, and is now
itself simply included among the societal subsystems.
33 Dobbelare
,
K., op . ci t
. ,
p . 382
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actor for the
individual (private) plane are an important f
entire society and not a particularly public matter.
All this has an important consequence for religion. Religion
can no longer control or direct the 'micro-motives' of its
members by symbolic or normative rules of conduct. The only
possible role for religion is a reactive and adaptive as well
as a correcting and compensating one. Here we find one reason
for a demystification or desacralization of religion, as has
already been mentioned; religion has to react according to
its members' demands and needs.
In a functionally differentiated society religion is nothing
but one social phenomenon among others, hence a subsystem of
society. Understood like this, religion does not neccessarily
have, in opposition to Durkheim's evaluation, an integrative
function, since the individual, without suffering social,
repudiative damage, can share social life within society and
its subsystems while being, for example, essentially unreli-
gious. Religion is in a modern society no longer capable of
changing or controlling societal development. Rather,
religion finds its reduced role in self
-ref lection and in its
limited relation to the societal environment.
The fact that religion plays a new role in modern society
throws, in turn, new light on the integration debate, i.e. on
the above-mentioned decline-conformity discussion. Luhmann
'
s
suggestions go beyond the Parsonian new role and new location
religion in society, and even extend the meaning of the
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^ ®Qira t i on debater
soclir. which°Par sons tress
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f
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6grati0n ° £
These basic values are, however, difficult to articulate
explicitly, since no specification adumbrates them so clearly
that a complete consensus becomes possible. And even if that
were possible, then, according to Luhmann, there are still
problems of translation', i.e. the formulation, for example,
of these values in party platforms. Party platforms are
concrete political programs "...which can't be logically
transferred from such core values as freedom, solidarity and
justice. There is no way of deducing them on the basis of
rational decisions." 93
If there are, then, problems in the explicit articulation and
in the translation of these values, value intergration cannot
be looked upon as a major integrative mechanism of society.
In contrast to societies in which integration was managed by
assigning the individual to a certain social class, according
to whether highborn or lowborn, this is no longer possible in
34 Dobbelaere
,
K.
,
op. cit., p.384
35 Luhmann, Niklas
, Grundwerte als Zivilreliqion
,
Cologne 1981
cit. by Dobbelaere, K. , op. cit. p.384
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a highly complex and functionally differentiated society m
modern society subsystem for. an •inner-societal environment
for each other- (Dobbelaere.
, mediating integration.
AS complementary roles and societal subsystems piay an
important part not only i„ the integration process but also
in the search for a more comprehensive understanding of
religion, two results stand at the end of this discussion.
Firstly, the bridging element between the two paradigms seems
to be the study of complementary roles. This ties the two
levels of analysis in their research context together.
Secondly, the artificial separation of the individual,
cultural and subsystematic analysis of religion is eliminated
and offers, therefore, the possibility of a more cohesive
study of religion, since, as it has been shown, all approa-
ches to the study of religion discussed here, are inter-
related and interdependent.
Since we are not concentrating on a comprehensive understan-
ding of religion per se, but are trying to outline some
general implications of religion for the individual voter’s
decision, we needn’t stress our discussion of the societal
level in particular. Hence, before we turn to the religious
voter s decisions, certain causes or consequences of secula-
rization, - rationalization, privatization and pluralism-
with respect of their influence on the individual now take a
central place in our discussion.
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Rationalizati on
Rationalization, basically, appears in Max Weber's- work in
two different dimensions. The first type of rationalization,
in short, is Weber's key feature for the development of
capitalism. Only with the rationalized form of mercantile
action (e.g. cost-benefit calculation, bookkeeping, etc) as
it was developed in the West, was today's rationalized
capitalism possible. The second dimension of rationalization,
which operates on a more individual level, Weber called
disenchantment" of the world (Entzauberung) 5
7
. This is the
basis for the third model of secularization we discussed
above. Disenchantment can be conceived, firstly, as a
rationalization of the Roman-Catholic belief, beginning
manifestly with Luther's reformation. Protestantism abolished
the belief in saints, took away blessed water, etc. and
established a religion that was to some extent freed from
suspicious rituals and mediators between God and the belie-
ver. On the other hand, science opened the way to a more
rational and causal description and explanation, not only in
terms of religion, but embracing every realm, discussing and
evaluating things in a rational-causal fashion. Seen in this
36 We refer here, of course, to Weber’s The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism .
37 Berger's term for the same phenomenon is "demystification".
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everthing
, it seats, could be explained, s accoraing ^
thlS neW VieW ° f the WOrld
- *><•«. there was a switch £rom
a tere religiously backed plausibility structure to a tore
scientific, rational and clear-headed understanding of the
world. This understanding was sited at providing answers to
questions about the meaning of life in an fashion appropriate
to an emancipating, •for the time being", protestant humani-
ty. It is clear that, unavoidably, religion wasn't excluded
from this development; it was discussed and questioned, too.
The consequence has already been mentioned; religion declined
from being an overarching explanatory and legitimizing
bone of society to becoming merely one subsystem among
others
.
Functional differentiation on the societal level and rationa-
lization on the individual level gave way to a de-emphasis of
traditional "nonrational
- values like honesty, kindness,
meaningfulness, self-realization, but stressed the meaning of
effectiveness and efficiency. This split Bell 59 called the
separation of the techno-economic realm, which emphasises
efficiency and effectiveness, and culture, within which
meaningfulness and self-realization have a central position.
38 or perhaps only "described". It could be argued that
modern science offers no real explanation of pheno-
mena but only the increasingly successful means to
describe and predict. On this view real explanation
must address the question of why the world is ordered
as it is.
39 Bell, Daniel, "The Return of the Sacred ?" British
Journal of Sociology
. Vol.28 No . 4 , p.419-449
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If these two realms do indeed exist, then, according to Bell
a new role for religion has to develop in modern society.
This, m turn, is a similar result, considering Luhmann
'
s
evaluation, of the adaptive role of religion in the future.
Thomas Luckmann described the shift of traditional religion
from a legitimzing authority to a mere subsystem, and its
declining importance on the societal level, as follows:
and Jha 2"
1 fomentation of the social structuret e dissolution of the traditional, coherentsacred cosmos affected not only religion as a1
^
stltution but also the relation of
tion^? 'i SPeCifiCally religi°us representa-
tion^ h
he Values of other specialized institu-doma
f
n s. The prevalent norms in the variousinstitutionai areas, especially economics andpolitics
, were increasingly legitimated by functio-
nal rationality. 60
Hence, in a system in which individual expectations and
goals, stemming genuinely from a religious background, are
only of marginal interest for the entire system, individual
and societal interests clash. Tasks or roles an individual
has to fulfill within an institution as a so-called "corpo-
rate actor" (Fenn61 ) stand in high contrast to the indivi-
dual s own interests and rights. The function or role the
60 Luckmann, Thomas, The Invisible Religion
. New York
1967, p.101
61 Fenn, Richard, Towards a Theory of Secularization
.
Monograph Series of the Society for the Scientific
Study of Religion. No . 1 , 1978, p.66
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individual performs
, not the personality of the actor, is
What is interesting for the societal system. Thus, processes
that integrate subjective interests into the techno-economic
realm seldom take place. This separation of interests has
almost no consequences for the corporate world, since
control of the individual is always possible.
The individual, however, seems to respond to this anonymous
situation, recognizing that a replacement of the incumbent
corporate actor is always possible, by becoming irres-
ponsible and alienated as a person. Separating the private
irrational" or "cultural sphere" from the public "rational"
or techno-economic" sphere, the individual seems to gain
autonomy, which makes a fulfillment of personal interest and
self-realization posssible.
Privatization
Thus the consequence of rationalization for the individual,
it appears, is a frustration of the individual in the public
sphere, since there is no place for individual interests that
do not fit the public interest perfectly. The more the
individual suffers from the notion of anonymity and the
possibility of job replacement, the more this frustration can
manifest itself in an expression of growing irresponsibility
in the task performed as a corporate actor. As a result of
this feeling of anonymity and fear of replacement, the
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individual finds in th
. private sphere a refuge in which
self-realization. self-determinism. and "irrational" values
can asssume central importance.
This autonomy of the private sphere is, nevertheless, only
seeemingly private and autonomous, since the means, which
this private world is built up with, are not of autonomous
nature, that is, an individual finds inspiration and motiva-
tion by personal friends or family members, who are themsel-
ves, in turn, influenced or inspired by wider social circles.
As the features or characteristics that might influence an
individual are, therefore, either objects of an entirely
private sphere, nor autonomously to be adapted, a private
sphere is, seen from this perspective, neither private nor
autonomous
.
In the search for a private world, new individually deter-
mined meaning systems are developed. This "tailoring of an
individual religion" and world is called privatization.
Luckmann sees privatizations as "assortments of 'ultimate'
meanings", which differ significantly from the traditional,
sacred cosmos. Whereas, according to Luckmann, the traditio-
nal view formed a sacred cosmos that was a coherent and well
articulated universe, the modern cosmos is characterized as a
loose edifice of explanatory models that are appropriate to
meanings of ultimate' significance. However, the
latter modern cosmos is rarely, in contrast to the sacred
one, internalized by the individual, nor does the modern
63
cos.cs represent a coherent universe. Modern believers tailor
their belief system in a consu.atory for. according to their
individual needs and demands, taking bits and pieces fro. the
former assortments of 'ultimate' meaning. Individual religion
is therefore, not to be taken as "...a replica or approxima-
tion" of the traditional
"official" model of religion. This
new form of individual religion is neither based on the
primary institutions of traditional religion nor on the
political or economic secular system:
Our analysis of church religion in modern societysharply pointed up the fact that the modern sacred
^, as . a whole no longer rests on institutionsspecializing in the maintenance and transmission of
a sacred universe. On the basis of our observation
on the secular 1 ’ institutional ideologies we maysay , fur thermore
, that the sacred cosmos as a wholedoes not rest on other primary and specializedinstitutional areas whose main functions are not
religious -
... The effective social basis of the
modern sacred cosmos is to be found in neither the
churches nor the state nor the economic system.
.
.
It is the direct accessibilty of the sacred cosmos,
more precisely, of an assortment of religious
themes, which makes religion today essentially a
phenomenon of the "private sphere. 62
Since the demands and needs of the individual for religion
have their origin in private experience, resting on emotions
and sentiments, individual religions are highly subjective.
Luckmann conceives these conceptions as being in a high
62 Luckmann, T.
,
op.cit. p.103
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degree unstable, and therefore not easy to articulate, since
primary institutions are not the bases of these individual
reiigions
, secondary institutions try to articulate the
topics and concerns arising in the private sphere and offer
their articulations as perfectly preproduced suggestions of
"private, 'ultimate’ meaning. Hence,
"inspirational litera-
ture" as Luckmann calls it, like popular psychological
publications such as "Reader's Digest" or "Playboy Magazine",
can serve as secondary institutions offering an appropriate
individual articual tion of personal ultimate’ meanings and
concerns
.
Of course, a purely private sphere simply does not exist.
Prilnary public institutions, since they are not the
bases of individual religions, cannot maintain a common
sacred cosmos. Moreover, and in consequence, these primary
institutions can merely regulate only the economic and legal
frame in which privatization takes place. And thirdly,
the diffusion of the sacred cosmos through the
social structure characterizes societies in which
the "private sphere" in the strict sense of the
term does not exist and in which the distinctionbetween primary and secondary institutions is
meaningless
.
6 3
The shape of individual religion in modern society, formed by
rationalization and privatization has therefore changed
63 Luckmann, T. op.cit., p.104
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considerably in comparison to a traditionally conceived
religion. There is no longer an "official" model of religion
for an entire society, performing legitimizing and moral
conduct functions. Religion is degraded and subject to a
buyer's choice", which in turn is itself highly dependent on
the personal, individual, to use Luckmann's term, "social
biography of the religious consumer. Individual religion,
unless it is not highly reflected and consciously deliberated
to create an individual micro-universe, is likely to include
in its meaning system "more or less appropriate rhetorical
elements from the (traditional) sacred cosmos". Hence,
Luckmann suggests that
the assumption seems justified, therefore, that theprevalent individual systems of "ultimate" signifi-
hierLhi
11
S
0n
n
1St ° f a loose and rather unstablerac y of opinions" legitimating the affectively determined priorities of "private" life. 64
Privatized religion is completely detached from the functio-
nally differentiated, rational society. Since there is no
support from rational society, those who surround the
individual in his/her private sphere gain importance. These
persons offer a stabilizing feature for privatized religion
by only partially sharing a religion with others or even
constructing a religion of their own. This move towards
stability is useful, because the conflict with the rational
64 Luckmann, T.
, op.cit., p.105
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character of the functionally
unlikely to occur in this private
family assumes in this process an
dif f erntiated sphere is
nonrational sphere. The
important role. But also
other persons who are m immediate contact with the private
sphere of the individual have a considerable value in this
respect
:
Friends, neighbors, members of cliques formed atwork and around hobbies may coml to s™ve as
and^stah??* °^
hers " wh0 share in the construction
"ultimate"
11
- ^
° f "Private" universes of
significance. If such universes coalesce
assume
e
almnsr
e
' groups ^Porting them may
whft^e ! n ar^f" characteristics and develop
„
"® earlier called secondary institutions...
remains
e
th
SS
'
*5 ” S3fe t0 assume that the faminlye most important catalyst of "private"
universes of significance"
s
If private religion is constructed, stabilized and maintained
by a partial, if not complete, reflection and discussion with
other persons within the private sphere, another feature of
modern, privatized religion becomes liekly. That is, the
privatized religion may appear to vary considerably in
respect of its contents; nevertheless, it is not too much to
assume that the structures of meaning and explanation within
these individual religions are very similar. In addition,
because a permanent reflection and change in these structures
is possible, individual religion is relatively unstable or,
63 Luckmann, T.
,
op.cit., p.106
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to formulate the matter more positively, flexible,
in sum, privatization is a way of creating not only a meaning
system of ultimate significance but, more important, a
process of self
-legitimation within a complex and rational,
functionally differentiated, society. This conclusion appears
to be not too venturesome; what else can be behind such an
enormous individual effort to find meaning for one’s life ?
Individual religion serves to define one’s situation in
society and clarifies the individual’s self-understanding in
the daily life of social interaction. The traditional,
overarching religion had offered modes of moral conduct and
has given plausibility structures in the form of a cohesive
universe. In a modern secular society, individual religion
has to serve both functions. Hence, it seems plausible to
understand individual religion, as a form of self-legitima-
tion as well as a meaning system of ultimate significance.
Finally, Luckmann ' s conclusion is no contradiction to our
interpretation of this phenomenon. He sees individual
religion as an appropriate expression of religion in a
contemporary, modern society.
Pluralism
The possiblity of choosing among a certain number of avail
able "assortments of 'ultimate' meanings" is one feature of a
phenomenon we want to stress in our discussion of secula-
68
rization: Pluralism, since we have alredy di
ly, anyway, the consequences of plurali
scussed implicit-
we now complete the di
sm for the individual
,
scussion with a look at the "social-
structual dimension’’
, as the following authors have called
what we previously referred to as the ’societal level'. Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann^ give us a detailed idea of their
understanding of pluralism in the following definition:
there
M°Uld de£ine pluralism ^ a situation in which
of f?
competition in the institutional ordering
_^
h
'
.
co™Phehensive meanings for everyday lif e
9
Historically, such competition generally succeeds a
is
tUa
piurai?sm
hif = ^nt^Tha?
process “of'de-monopolization?
9961106 ° f 3
Pluralism as defined here is thus, as a consequence of a
historical process, particularly to be found in highly diffe-
rentiated societies. If there are legitimizing problems on
the individual level, so are there also on the social-
Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. "Secularization and
Pluralism"
, International Yearbook for the Soci ology
of Religion
. Vol.2, 1966, p.73ff
“
This definition is ambiguous in two respects.
Firstly
,
if de-monopolization can be conceived as aphenomenon within the general process of seculariza-
tion (which seems to be the case), then Berger and
Luckmann explicitly avoid defining pluralism as a
consequence of secularisation. They do so for good
reasons, we agree. Secondly, it is quite possible
to understand pluralism as the result of seculariza-
tion. However, as this problem does not immediately
touch our present concern, we intend to stay with the
definition given. Suffice it to say here that this
issue invites thorough discussion.
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structural level. Berger and Luckmann conceive this process
Of the declining importance of religion in society as the
perpetual decline of the state as an enforcement agency for
religious institutions. Globally this decline appeared,
particularly, of course, in Christian belief. Even in states
in which political power was based partially on religion, a
tendency towards this development was clearly observable. The
role of the state in a pluralistic society ends up in the
form of an 'impartial traffic policeman, setting down certain
regulations for the competing religious groups" (Berger S
Luckmann), but is, beyond this function, reluctant to
interfere in the clashes and competitions among these groups.
This laissez-faire behavior of the state can assume a more
active or a more passive role, depending on the ideological
and pragmatic interests of the state itself, as well as
depending on these factors: the degree of pressure a reli-
gious group can put on the state, how much importance this
religius group has in society, what historical role this
group has played in history, and so on. Thus, for example, in
the United States every religious group, no matter of what
interest to the state, enjoy the same tax status whereas in
Germany religions that have gained the status of 'corpora-
tions of public law’ enjoy particular privileges
.
(This
,
besides, is hold to be one reason for the absolutely diffe-
rent developments of churches in parts of Europe — Scandinav-
ia, West Germany, Italy - and the United States, where a
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properly separated church-state relationship caused seculari-
zation of the churches fro, inside 8 a )
. As a general effect
of the side-by-side existence of religious groups without any
form of monopolized status of the one or the other religion,
every religion was forced to set up its own bureaucracy, not
only to deal with the state in a most effective way but also
to gain new members for the group and to inform, maintain and
keep its older membership, in short, the establishment of a
religious market was the consequence of the abolishment of
the state’s role as an enforcement agency of one particular
religion. Hence, even the world of religions has been
conducted by the rules of rational-causal calculation of
effectiveness and efficiency. it is important to see that
this market situation is only one part of the efficiency and
effectiveness-measurement that the executives of the approp-
riate religious groups have to undergo; on the one side there
is the religious market situation, on the other side, in
addition, the expectations, demands and needs, in short, the
adaptive role of religion towards its members. These execu-
tives are not the traditional religious "prophetical" men one
might expect of a person working in a religious group as an
executive
:
68 Wilson, B., Religion in Sociological Perspective
,
New York 1982, p.152. Wilson states that "...in
America secularizing processes appear to have
occurred within the church, so that although
religious institutions persist, their specifically
religious character has become steadily attenuated."
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“
• nr-
metis'
by that of frisky sensible organization
The religious market situation and the relationship of the
religous groups to each other also have some consequences. As
Luckmann has argued, privatized religions are similar in
their structures. In addition, an individual religion does
not exclude membership in a religious group, given that there
is a fit between the individual's and the group's religion.
That, in turn, would mean that the religous groups on the
religous market differ only to a limited extent from each
other. Luckmann and Berger have called this similarity in the
contents of religious meaning a marginal differentiation.
This mariginal differentiation serves two purposes. Most
important, this differentiation is the legitimation of all
marginally differentiated groups. It is their raison d'etre,
within which both the theologian and the religious organiza-
tion man have equally important jobs . The theologian provides
the religious argument as to why a certain group differs from
another and why this is so essential theologically. The
religious organization promotes and markets the religion. On
the other hand, this marginal differentiation has a second
69 Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., op.cit., p.77
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effect. Economic and psychological necessities force
religous groups to carry out an economic market policy with
fixed regulations. A laissez-faire policy on the religous
market is as costly and unbearable as it was in other
(Secular) markets. Hence regulations governing competition as
well as cooperation among somewhat more related religous
groups (creation of cartels, are also to be found on the
religious market. The reason for this is simple:
Put crudely,
cutting each
good. Both
that "prices
it is not only too expensive
® throat, but it doesn't
economic and public relation
be fixed". 70
to go on
look so
suggest
No matter how perfectly this differentiation develops,
certain tasks that are not easy to performe still remain for
each religious group. One of these we have already mentioned;
it concerns the maintaining of older membership. Even these
older members of the religious group have to get used to this
market situation. Put differently, as a consequence of
pluralism, the religous groups must simultaneously stress
their differences and importance in comparison to other
religious groups, while they at the same time have to
cultivate and emphasize the traditional religious heritage.
In addition, members of different social classes, target
groups, and particular societal circles must also be kept
70 Berger, P. and Luckmann, T.
,
op.cit., p.78
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the
interested, since these persons are important for
religious group, not only in economic, but also in repudia-
tional terms.
That all these features of pluralism have implications and
consequences for the individual is more than obvious. How
these consequences are dealt with, and in what manner, we
need not discuss again, since this was already a focus of
attention while we were discussing privatization. We have now
arrived at the very beginning of the interrelated set of
terms we wanted to stress. Therefore, there could be no
better moment to end the debate concerning rationalization,
privatization and pluralism, in particular, and the seculari-
zation debate in general. To complete the latter within the
framework of our unpretentious project, a basic look at the
limits and limitations of secularization should not, however,
be left out.
Limits and Limitations
There are several perspectives from which to criticize "secu-
larity", as we may term the result of the process of secula-
rization. One may discuss the development of secularization
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up until recently, looking, as Peter Berger- did, at changes
and weakenings of the theoretical predictions that had been
nade. Or, as Larry Shiner did. one might discuss the variety
Of the uses of the term itself and conclude that it is better
to drop the term completely from a scientific discussion
because of its unbearable ambiguities. Another reasonable
approach to criticize a theory is to examine the various
approaches scientists have followed in studying the seculari-
zation concept, as David Lyonia has recently done.
In any case, one comes to interesting and valuable points of
criticism, which sometimes reveal the worth and validity of
these studies only to scholars who have been dealing with
secularization in a most concentrated, detailed and highly
theoretical fashion. Since we have discussed secularization,
here only in a limited way, we take ourselves to be neither
competent nor entitled to judge, in the present study, the
contribution the concept of secularization can make to the
understanding of modern society. Some basic remarks should
suffice here, noting that there are several aspects within
Berger, Peter L. "From the Crisis of Religion to the
Secularization”, On Religion and America:
Spiritual Life in a Secular Age
. Douglas
,
Mary and
Tipton, Steven (eds.) Boston, Beacon Press, 1982
72 Lyon, David, "Rethinking Secularization : Re trospect
and Prospect, Review of Religious Research
. Vol.26,
No. 3, 1985
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the secularization concept” which are in need of refers, or
even correction. This implies that we do not intend to
discuss the limitations of secularization on the social-
structural or subjective level; doing that would mean
Violating our rule against detailed critique. Hence the goal
is to think, briefly, of some limits and limitations of
secularization in general.
One question which is surely among the major ones in secu-
larization theory is whether secularity is indeed capable of
replacing religion completely. Reviewing the development
retrospectively, Peter Berger answers this question negative-
ly. Referring to Weber's theodicy thesis, Berger concludes
that secularization was never able to offer an equally
effective, or even convenient, alternative to the theodicy-
function of traditional religion. Theodicy gave a convincing
and consoling interpretation of the suffering and injustices
of everyday life, which were interpreted as being parts of
the this-worldy life of (at least Christian) humanity.
Therefore, since secularization isn't able to substitute this
"mental tranquillizer" by using rational-causal explanations
Maybe it is too late to pay attention to the question
of whether one should speak of a theory, or only of a
concept, of secularization. It should be mentioned
that one can think of secularization in either way.
However, if one speaks of a theory of secularization,
then there must be a model of the theory. To fulfill
the scientific expectations of a theory, the model
must explain, describe and predict the consequences
and effects of secularization.
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and descriptions or offering the propsect of an age of never
ending progress, religion didn’t fade away as was predicted,
but, to the contrary, gained new credibility.
Secularly understood as a phenomenon of modernity raises the
question of the viability of secularization. With the
Phenomenon of secularization as a part of modernity goes the
common conclusion that pluralism is also a modern phenomenon.
Though this proposition is not quite true - there were, in
fact, earlier forms of secularity and pluralism independent
of each other in Confucian China and in pre-Muslim India-
modern secularity and pluralism are subjects of strong
attack and countermovements in modern society. The main
difference lies in the fact that today secularity and
pluralism do not exist independently of each other, but
encourage each other:
In modern society, in contrast, secularity andpluralism are mutually reinforcing phenomena.Secularization fosters the civic arrangements under
which pluralism thrives, while plurality of world
views undermines the plausibility of each one and
thus contributes to the secularizing tendency. 74
The viability of secularization is hence in doubt, if, even
with such a fecund soil for both secularity and plurality in
modern society
, fanatical and extreme countermovements arise
' 4 Berger, Peter L. "From the Crisis of Religion to the
Crisis of Secularization", op.cit., p. 15
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in response. The Ajatollah Khomeini's militant and brutal
Iran is not an unique phenomenon. Islamic revivalism. neo-
Buddhist activism and Hindu traditionalism, not to leave out
Christian sects in Latin America, also have this
global, countersecular motivation in common.
The paradox in all these developments is that secularization
both arises out of, and also opposes, pluralism. This fact
needs explanation. Plurality understood as the simultaneous
coexistence of various, equally acknowledged, world views
hampers the institutionalization of one particular world view
as well as all kinds of secular dogmatism. Hence, plurality
can also serve as a source of countermovements against
secularity. These countermovements against can assume "hot"
or "cool" forms of reaction™. Hot reaction tends to be
fanatical and frenetic, trying to re-establish the one or
other form of traditional religion, thus fighting both
secularization and pluralism; cool reaction, in turn, rather
assumes an adaptive role in dealing with secularity, trying
to limit secularity
' s influence on the appropriate religion.
The deterministic view of secularization, which predicted the
gradual cessation of religion the more secularity was estab-
lished, needs, therefore, considering all the countermove-
ments, thorough discussion, if not correction:
75 Berger P. and Luckmann T.
, "Secularization and
Pluralism", op.cit. p.81
78
It not reasonable to expect a
If one takes into account, in addition, the various concepts
of secularization as Shiner has discussed them, and the
different possible levels of analysis, knowing that neither
problem is not yet completely solved, the concept or theory
of secularization used as a scientific-analytical instrument
suffers severe damage. Both the operational basis of secula-
rization and the factual development of secularity offer
solid reasons to debate the theory as a whole. A theory, as
Greeley said, has to be broad to be general. This may be
true. But if, as is the case with secularization, the
essential assumptions and propositions of a theory are
repeatedly quasi-f alisf ied through empirical observation,
then a reasonable person will question or reject the entire
theory. The admonition of Shiner and Rendtorff is approp-
riate; first, describe thoroughly what you mean by seculari-
zation (concept and level of analysis)
, then ask yourself to
what extent you can use it. As Rendtorff puts the matter:
Die Sakularisierungs these ist dann...nicht mehr
materialiter interessant, sondern als ein Moment in
der Analyse der gegenwartigen Selbs tauslegung der
76 Berger, P."From the Crisis of Religion to the Crisis
of Secularization", op.cit.,p.23
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Gesellschaft und
sellschaft lichen
®SSt
i
mmung der gesamtge-Verf lechtung der Religion. 7 ’
In other words, the secularization concept is appropriate as
a descriptive instrument within the analysis of secularity in
modern society. But it is, on the other hand, as an analyti-
cal tool no longer interesting.
Nietzsche’s famous pronouncement, "God is dead," especially
with the added comment "and we have killed him" 7 * has been
widely taken to herald the secularization of Western society
and culture. We have not discussed in this chapter either the
theological or the philosophical merits of Nietzsche's
thesis. But we have considered in some detail the various
models of secularization recent social theorists have offered
us. We have examined whether their models might help us
describe the changing role of religion in modern society and
perhaps even explain some of the changes that have taken
place and predict others that are imminent.
However, the various models show that even these theorists do
not always agree about the phenomenon "secularization". As a
result, the secularization-image remaining of this scientific
theoretical quarrel appears as a "misty entity" nobody really
77 Rendtorff, Trutz, "Zur Sakularisierunsproblematik"
,
International Yearbook for the Sociology of Religion ,
Vol.2, 1966, p . 61
70 Nietzsche, F. Die frohliche Wissenschaf t , III (125),
in: Colli, Giorgio, Montinari Mazzino, Nietzsche
Werke
, Vol.2, Berlin 1973, p.153
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knows how to describe precisely, what, can one, nevertheless,
take as a general idea of secularization ? Bryan Wilson, we
think, has paraphrased the matter in a way that the maybe the
smallest, common basis of all the approaches to secularizat-
ion we have discussed; it is certainly a really wide depic-
tion of secularization being simultaneously close to all
approaches
:
Which
term secularization I mean that process byw religious institutions, actions, and consci-ousness, lose their social significance.’*
This description covers both the individual and societal, and
the private and the public context of the discussed concepts
and approaches of secularization.
Our goal was, therefore, twofold; for one thing, we intended
to demonstrate the development, problems, contexts, concepts
and analytical models of secularization. Secondly, we tried
to outline certain features of secularization as they were
conceived in the scientific discussion that deals with this
phenomenon and its forms in modern society.
Now we have reached at a point where we see both confusion
and controversy. We see confusion, since we might be insecure
as to what concept and what analytical approach we ought to
take for our further study. We see also controversy among the
scientists, but we are told that this is a normal and fecund
79 Wilson, B., Religion in Sociological Perspective
,
Oxford, 1982, p.149
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state of affairs in all sciences and no one should worry
about it. Hence, we modestly like to stick to our genuine
goal of a general idea of secularization, which, we believe,
is reasonably and most unproblematically met with Wilson’s
paraphrase, since even Wilson finds no reason to change his
own description after a decade of his study of seculariza-
tion, we can not err to much with this decision.
Nevertheless, for our own study, we are in need of a analyti-
cal concept that enables us to continue our own study. Hence,
we shall discuss, in the following, ways and means to analyze
secularization.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYZING SECULARIZATION
Methodological Considerations
Secularization, as we know the term now, is a controversial
and ambiguous word for a theory or concept in the study of
religion. What we have also learned, is that it fails to be
simultaneously both an analytical tool and a descriptive
concept. If it is precisely defined in its connotation so as
to be a descriptive tool to demonstrate secularity, it can't
be applied as an analytical tool. The reason is obvious: even
if we set up a distinctive level of analysis and an accurate
interpretation of our secularization concept, the most
important part is still missing; that is, how we proceed in
our analysis methodologically and what measures for what kind
of variables we should use. In other words, we need a recipe,
an analytical model that helps us to clarify both the object
of our study and the way we can approach it.
Analytical models of secularization are not easy to find.
Many authors have tried analytically to show some evidence of
secularization in modern society. They have asked themselves
questions, either on the societal or on the individual level
of analysis, questions that seemed to be helpful to make some
aspects of secularity visible. However, they haven't con-
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structed a generally applicable analytical framework which,
with only slight changes, could be applied in the one or
other case. Rather, the reverse development has been the
case. Different models, appropriate to answer these specia-
lized questions have been established, with the result that
these models perfectly fit their creator's purpose, but are
not, unfortunately, compatible among each other. One can
think of this as a vice in the secularization concept, though
at least two scientists, Fenn" » and Wuthnow"", tried to offer
analytical recommendations as to how secularization should be
analyzed. Fenn made the point that an essential distinction
between the structural-functional approach and the Parsonian
action-theory approach is to be made before one starts off to
analyze secularization. Wuthnow recommended a "logit-regres-
sion analysis" stemming originally from biology, while he,
simultaneously, limited the range of the method by insisting
that it shouldn't be used all alone without another analyti-
cal method.
Almost a decade before Fenn and Wuthnow, Gerhard Lenski 8
2
used, instead of one of the before-mentioned approaches, a
Fenn, Richard, The Secularization of Values
, Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion . Vol.9, 1970
p . 112f f
.
81 Wuthnow, Robert and Blackwood, Larry, Logit Regres-
sion Techniques in the Study of Religion, Review of
Religious Research
, Vol.19, No . 1 , 1977 p.H2ff
82 Lenski Gerhard, The Religious Factor . New York 1961
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sample survey that resulted in quite powerful and under-
standable figures and tables explaining the relationship and
influence of religion on economics, politics, family, and
science. Even if his study is criticized today in respect of
its representativeness
- one point among others is that the
distribution of the denominations in Detroit was not quite
normal it is surprising that this commonly acknowledged
empirical methodolgy wasn't also used by other scientists of
the same discipline.
The logit-regression model is an useful method if one surveys
a particular phenomenon and its changes over time. This is an
important supplement for the study of religion in particular.
Our question here would fit perfectly the requirements of the
logit regression analysis. The problem, however, is the data.
For an accurate analysis over time, the same variables should
be analyzed to gain precise indications of a change over
time. Particularly if one deals with religious attitudes and
the individual's identification with his/her denomiantion and
their change over time, identical items of the different time
perods should be used. Unfortunately, as many scientists have
complained, such data over a reasonable period of time are
h^^dly available for ready use in the sociology of religion.
Hence, as a kind of substitute, the logit-regression analysis
was developed and acknowledged to allow at least certain
implications for a religious change over time. In a compre-
hensive analysis of change in German politics, Kendall Baker,
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Russell Dalton and Kai Hildebrands
• have profited from the
huge data pool of the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPR) in Ann Arbor, the
Zentralarchiv fur empirische Sozialforschung in Cologne, and
the Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen in Mannheim
to research the political transformations in Western Germany
from 1953 to 1972. They have also focused, of course, on
religous aspects, but not in the detail we would need for our
purpose here, simply because they have concerned themselves
with quite different aspects in their research.
An analysis of religious change can’t be observed at one
particular point in time. That means, in other words, that if
we wanted to use the logit-regression method to see to what
extent religious voters have changed their behavior concer-
ning seculan ty and secularization, we would have to accumu-
late the appropriate data from this data pool for at least
one decade. After we had accumulated these data, the next
step to take would be to pick the variables touching religion
and politics and test their accountability. Only after this
filtering (the most direct way would probably be cross-
tabulations) could we start with the logit-regression method
to look for our phenomena and their changes over time. In
short, using the same data pool for a religious change in
time would still be an enormous, maybe in some sense even
83 Baker, Kendall, Dalton, Russell and Hildebrandt, Kai
Germany Transformed - Political Culture and New
Politics
. Harvard 1981
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are
inappropriate, effort within our study's framework. There
several reasons for this inappropriateness. The huge amount
Of data which would have to be analyzed is not the major
point here. Rather, it is whether these data are a useful
answer our question as to whether there are some aspects of
secularization in voting behavior. The data, unfortunately,
do not include the information over time needed for an
accurate religious-change-over-time-anaysis
. For example,
personal charateristics like religious preference, age, sex,
etc. have always been included as questions. Yet, essential
data for our study weren't collected for the entire time
range of the data pool from 1953 to 1972, nor even, for our
purposes, for any significant part of it. Certain questions
promising for our concern were sometimes only asked once; for
example, it was asked only in 1953 whether the respondent was
married in a church ceremony, or how strong his participation
in church activities were. These and others are questions,
that surely could have helped to demonstrate the declining or
increasing church affiliation of the respondents. Another
question, whether church influence should be curtailed was
asked in two different waves in 1969 but never before, nor in
the following polls. We could go on here to complain about
the missing data in this fascinating three-decade data set.
At the end, however, we would simply have to recognize that
neither the socio-economic identifications with religious
groups or the community, nor the moral and religous issues
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are as continous and detailed as would be needed for such an
analysis. Nevertheless, there are data available that offer
convenient information for research of aspects that are
fairly close related to our problem. since we intend to use
these studies to show some evidence of our owm problem, we
will return to those researches later.
Meanwhile, we are, whether we like it or not, dependent on
other models and methods to make our point. Our special
question is, firstly, to what extent voting decisions in
Western Germany can be taken as an indictor of secularizing
processes. If this indicator is significant, secondly,
whether there is a constant vote, or whether some develop-
ments to be observed disturb this constancy. This set of
questions then, if they can be answered positively should be
appropriate to show one aspect of secularity. But before we
can discuss the latter, several absolutely essential things,
without which our concern wouldn't be conceivable nor
understandable, remain to be done; first, since our question
is very specialized, a model must clarify our approach, and
secondly, as important as the first point, a basic survey of
the development of the German parties and their adherents is
necessary. That the denominations have to be discussed in
this political context, goes without saying.
Finally, before we start to create our own model, some
remarks about the voting decision as one possible indicator,
out of a infinite number of others, are needed to justify our
88
was shown by
project
.
That religion and politics arP \e (closely) related
a large number of studies. One of the most prominent is
Lenski’s Detroit study which not only undoubtedly demonstra-
ted the close relationship between religion and politics
empirically, but also suggested that regular church attenders
more likely to vote than those who infrequently saw a
church from inside. Macaluso and Wanat 8
4
- with their own
method and model - showed further evidence of what Lenski has
suggested, namely that church attendance and voting are
closely related. Other studies, the 1952 study by Miller 83 or
the 1977 project by Cohen and Kapsis 88 showed similar suppor-
tive results. However, a few studies 8 ? indicate the opposite,
that is, that church attendance influences the politcal
participation negatively. Nevertheless, enough evidence is
available that religion and politics are related, whether
84 Macaluso, Theodore F. and Wanat, John, Voting turnout
and Religiosity, Polity
, No. 12, 1979, p.l58ff
83 Miller, Mungo, The Waukegan Study of Voter Turnout
Prediction, Public Opinion Quarterly
. No. 16, 1952
p. 381f f
.
86 Cohen , Stephen S. and Kapsis Robert E., Religion,
Ethnicity and Party affiliation in the U.S.: Evidence
from pooled Electoral Surveys 1968-1972, Social
Forces
, No. 56, 1977, p.637-653
87 for example see Madron, Thomas W ., Hart , M . Nelson
,
and
Raytha L. Yokley, "Religion as a determinant of
Militancy and Political Participation among black
Americans, American Behavioral Scientist . No. 17,
1974, p. 783f f
.
89
negatively or positively
. As voting is one of the most
important opportunities the individual has to articulate her
or his political affiliation and thus to participate in the
Political process
, we think that the voting behavior is, or
might be, a proper indicator even for secularizing processes.
Of course, this implies our assumption, that a voting
decision is made by the individual in accordance to his
religious belief and political value system. However, mere
church attendance as an indicator for religious attitudes or
religiosity in general is a controversial thing, too.
Church attendance may properly do the job if one is resear-
ching religion and voting turnout. If one, however, tries to
find some relationship between voting decision and religious
attitudes, then the mere frequencey of church attendance is a
helpful indicator in this latter respect, but it is by no
means valid as an exclusive indicator. If one relied on it
alone, privatized religion would be entirely left out of the
analysis, and thus a major feature of secularization would
simply not considered. Therefore, additional aspects of this
particular question must be taken into account.
80 For an extensive discussion of the relationshipbetween religion and politics, see J. Hilton Yinger
'
s
book, The Scientific Study of Religion
, particularly
chapter 18. In short, he develops three kinds of
relationship: (1) the identity of religious—group
membership and political-group membership ;( 2 ) the use
of religion by political powers; (3) religious
challenge to political powers.
For a jurisprudential discussion of the relation of
church and state in Germany, see Fischer, E. Trennuna
von Staat und Kirche
. Frankf urt/Main
,
1971
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An Analytical MoHpI
Dobbelaere tried to tie two levels of analysis together. Now,
in contrast to his approach, we shall try here to clarity our
object of research as much as possible, and in doing so,
isolate one aspect within a certain level of analysis and
separate it from all others.
The level of analysis is the individual level, as we are
dealing primarily with the voting decision of an individual.
However, the approach to this individual level can take place
in various ways. First, one might investigate the variety of
meanings religion can have for different individuals. On the
other hand, one person might think of religion as being too
orthodox-conservative or too liberal, whereas another might
conceive it as too neutral and objective, or even too
influential in some respect.
The contextual perception of religion by the individual is
also variable. One may think of religion in a dichotomous
relationship, for example, church against state; or, merely
concerning the individual alone, as to the nature of the
relationship between the individual and the church. Another
quite important context is the church's impact on the indivi-
dual's relation to society, or, succinctly, church affairs
themselves. If one connects the items in this incomplete list
of possible meanings and contexts to each other, a huge field
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Of research is created. To keep a clear concept of the object
being examined, one again has to reduce the field to a more
handy model to make it more comprehensible. For our project
of trying to show some aspect of secularity and seculariza-
tion in respect to voting decision, „e are in need of a model
capable of giving us information about the strength of a
person's attachment to the churchn n, and how significant church
and religion are for this individual.
Hence, we are dealing, to stick to our meaning-context
analogy, with the influence of the church on the individual;
contextually, the primary interest is the religion's or
church's political influence on the individual. Since this
can only take place through a religion-related channel, the
influence a church might have on the individual religously
cannot be excluded from a serious analysis. To be sure, both
aspects can't be conceived to be perfectly independent of
each other, but the reverse case, that they are absolutely
dependent on each other, is even less likely. Therefore,
since our immediate interest is the political side of this
matter, we shall concentrate in the following on the
question, how this question can be properly answered, that
is, first of all, operationalized. To demonstrate our point
graphically, we briefly sum up our previous discussion in the
following table:
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meanings of religion
contexts conservative liberal neutral influential
church and
state 1
church
affairs
church
'
s
impact on
the indi-
vidual ' s
relation
to society
2
relation-
ship of
the indivi-
dual to
church
and
religion
3
This sixteen cell table is by no means complete in respect-
ofthe possible aspects that might be interesting to the
student of secularization. But it gives at least an idea of
how many fields have to be covered to get a more or less
comprehensive picture of secularizing features in modern
society. Considering our own project, we might pick three
aspects from the table. (1) An influential religion within
the church-state dichotomy is surely related to this ques-
tion; (2) the religious influence and the impact of the
church on the individual is very likely to determine the
relationship an individual has to society. In this latter
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field We See the VOting decision located, since voting
decision is an expression as to whether one agrees or
disagrees with the policy a political party is pursuing. Last
but not least, we consider (3) the relationship of the
individual to church and religion, since there many of
Shiner’s secularization concepts fit in. Generally, the last
lines of the table might cover the majority of problems
which can be discussed on the individual level of analysis in
the secularization theory. By contrast, the first two lines
cover to some extent the major questions on the societal
level of analysis. To be sure, the society, as we already
know from Luckmann’s contributions, also has a big impact on
the individual in this respect. Corporate actors have a great
deal of influence on the individual in every form of social
interaction, regardless of whether the action is intentional
or not. In short, companies, parties, associations and clubs
the indiviudal is linked with, or aware of, have an influence
on his/her personal relationship to this corporate side of
life. Moreover, the corporate actors determine to a decisive
extent the form of private world the individual is to build
up as a reaction to the corporate world. To a considerable
extent, therefore, this aspect, too, has to be included in a
comprehensive analysis.
Each of the three fields we have picked, is independent of
the others. Indeed each of the sisteen cells is independent
of the rest. The fields can be examined individually, with,
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Possibly, see additional information to be gained from
neighboring cells or even from other cells of the table,
in our concrete case, we take one particular cell, namely the
indicated with (2), influential religion / church’s
impact on the individuals
' s relationship to society. Additio-
nal information, we think, can be gathered from the neighbo-
ring cell (3)
.
The basic fact "voting behavior" or, more
accurate, the turnout of the vote, plus some information
about the individual’s background in respect to church and
religion in general is supposed to give us some ideas about
the state of secularity. These cells might then give us an
answer to questions which are touched in the first two
societal lines of our table, or, again more accurate, to
evaluate some aspects of the development of secularity in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The outcome of this development,
whether it is significant or not, is what we would like to
cal1 political secularization
. To follow Shiner's recommenda-
tion, we want to clarify the term in advance before we then
use it later in our further discussion. Taking for granted
that there is a close relationship between politics and
religion, it is obvious that both poles have some influence
on each other. This influence can express itself in a more
direct way, and also in a more indirect fashion. For example,
as a direct influence of religion on politics might be the
pope's threat to excommunicate (1076, Pope Gregor VII.
excommunicated Henry IV.) the German Emperors during the
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early middle ages in the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations.
Examples of the direct influence of politics on religion are
easy to find . In the same time period, the middle ages, there
were for a short period two popes (1080, Klemens u. and
Gregor VII) a development which represents the direct
political impact of politics on religion in two respects;
f irs tly it was an attempt to break the power of the Pope in
Rome, and, secondly, it was an effort to weaken the ties of
the Roman-Catholic church to Germany, or, as a serious
weakening was in those times hardly possible, at least to
split the religious community into two different camps.
Another example in our times would be the establishment of
the Ajatollah Khomeini’s regime in Iran. This is the most
extreme example of a direct impact of religion on politics.
In this particular case, a not even areligious political
dictatorship was replaced by an extremely religious dictator-
ship ruled with a close orientation to the Koran and to
orthodox practice.
The indirect impact of both poles on each other is of a
different nature. Here, religious corporate actors, e.g. the
German Catholic Bishop’s Conference, try to have some impact
on politics by having letters of supprt read out in church in
advance of every federal election. These letters have become
less forceful from the post-war period up to now. This
development shows how the explicit call to vote the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) as the only eligible party for
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today the
Christians in the beginning, has changed until
bishops simply appeal to the Christian conscience of every
to vote in an appropriately responsible way. The
indirect impact of politics on religion can assume multiple
forms. There is a de-emphasis of church schools conceivable
(in it's extremest forms durign the time of the Second and
Third French Republic) with the goal of minimizing the reli-
gious influence on children and the public in general
(laizism)
. A disregard of ecclesiastical interests in the
political decision-making processes in general is likely to
weaken the church's position in society and also to limit the
church's scope of action.
Now either form of religious or political influence, of
course determines the individual's relation to church and
state. But this by no means implies that if a person deviates
from religion, or disagrees with the policy set by a certain
state, that this is a victory for the influence of one over
the other. There are many other reasons for such an indivi-
dual, deviational, development. However, the term "political
secularization" is to some extent related to the individual's
deviation from the church. The term describes the individu-
al s emancipation from the political influence and authority
of the church, not because of a restricted policy of the
state against the church, but for reasons we discussed when
we were looking at the phenomena of rationalization, privati-
zation and pluralism.
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Having co»e this far with our concept or model of a possible
analysis of secularization, the next question is how we can
operationalize our problem.
It seems to us that one can determine the impact of the
church's influence on the individual with the help of three
different categories of question. We want to term them the
religious, political, and social aspects of church influence,
a) The religious aspect of church influence
The questions asked in this category are supposed to give us
information about the strength of the individual's adherence
to his/her church. The agreement with religious teaching
is one of the questions. This agreement can be weaker or
stronger for each single member of a religious group. The age
of the respondent might in this case be a helpful bit of
additional information. Also, religious-moral values, as, for
example, honesty, may also be of different importance for
different religious individuals. The frequency of church
attendance is of course a valuable indicator of religious
adherence. However, it is important to make a distinction
between church attachment and religiosity. The frequency of
church attendance is, as we feel, not, by itself, an adequate
indicator of religiosity, since using it alone would exclude
some essential phenomena of secularization from being a part
or a form of individual religiosity. Church attendance, it
seems to us, is rather a legitimate measure to indicate the
individual's attachment to the church, in particular to his
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own parish. We would not, therefore, iike to f' x K go as far as
Macaluso and Wanat 8 9 who t-air 0 *ke the frequency of church atten-
dance as a proper indicator of religiosity, because we
already know that there are many Kinds of strong religiosity
possible unrelated to the frequency-of-church-attendance
measurement
. Nevertheless, frequency of church attendance is
an important tool worth using in an analysis. A final
question in this section is whether the respondent could
imagine his life without religion. This question might appear
fuzzy at first sight; it indicates, however, whether the
overarching bow of religion as something to be resulted for
an ethical and moral life has Kept its strength or has been
weakened even among religious individuals,
b) The political aspect of church influence
This section contains questions thought to be appropriate to
indicate the conceivable extent to which the church might
manipulate her members politically. All of these questions
are supposed to be aspects that might influence the indivi-
dual member’s voting decision. There is, firstly, the indivi-
dual's evaluation of the political importance of the church.
Do members of a church think that a church is politically
important ? Secondly, does the church have political authori-
ty ? And if so, in what terms can one think of this eccle-
siastical political authority ? A third question asks whether
religious meanings guide voting decisions. The answers should
89 Macaluso, Th
. and Wanat, J.,op.cit. p.160
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indicate whether religious content has an impact on the
voting decision. Finally, the respondents can be asked
Whether there is generally a place for religion in politics.
This question can indicate whether the separation of church
and state is also perceived on an individual level or
whether this separation is merely thought of as being a
jurisprudential neccessity without any consequences in modern
society
.
c) The social aspect of church influence
This last category is the one which seems to be the most
problematic in our analytical model. Since the social
influence of an institution is generally difficult to isolate
from other s influence, we have some considerable hesitation
about whether the following set of questions really represen-
ts adequately the church’s social influence on the indivi-
dual. The questions asked here are conceived to influence an
aspect, namely the individual life conduct that is much
broader in its dimension than the other two aspects we would
like to determine. Since we know that corporate actors,
private friends, family members etc. play an important role
in an individual's life conduct and view of the world, it is
a somewhat suspicous enterprise to reduce significantly this
huge life conduct area, even partially, to the church’s
influence. However, since the church, on the other hand, is
undoubtedly an essential element in this question, we can't
do wrong if we include her in our analytical model as at
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least one source of social influence among other sources.
Hence. we would like to know in this context whether a
respondent is religiously educated, and also to what extent
he participates socially in the parish life. In addition, an
answer to the question of the respondent's relationship to
other members of the religious group, and his personal
evaluation of his/her attitude towards a closer, even profes-
sional, contact with other members beyond the parish life
seems helpful while trying to indicate the church's social
impact on the individual.
Up to this point we have discussed the factors that seemed to
be important in the evaluation of the church's political
influence. The actual question we are interested in is, as we
have already mentioned, to what extent voting decisions can
be an indicator of secularization. Hence, what is missing in
our model is the time dimension. That means that the pre-
viously discussed model only then makes sense in respect to
our real question, if we examine the above mentioned items
over time, during different periods.
A not immidiately neccessary but surely informative aspect
can be included if one also separates again the age and the
educational status of the respondent. Hence, our analytical
recipe or model would graphically look like this:
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Church impact Possibl e outcome Concepts of secularization
The above table is an outline of our attempt to analyze the
church's impact on the individual. It shows also the diffe-
rent aspects which might contribute to the individual voting
decision as far as it is related to religion and to the
extent the church might have an influence on it.
Given that the religious impact weakens over time, we think
that most of Shiner's concepts of secularization fit in the
first line of the scheme. Whether this necessarily has to
happen via a declining church attachment is a question as to
how one understands secularization. In our study we have
chosen to use church attachment both because data concerning
it i s readily available and also because the concept of
secularization we are dealing with appear reasonable.
The second line of the table leads via the voting decision to
political secularization. The voting decision is, as the
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upward arrow indicates at least partially determined by the
social environment of the individual, in our case the
ligious group, private friends and corporate actors.
It is also influenced, as the downward arrow indicates, by
church attachment. Since we have already explained the term
political secularization, there is no need to repeat the
rationale behind this this form of secularization.
Finally, since the social impact of the church is apparently
also declining, the church's influence on the individual may
be replaced by other elements of the individual social
environment. One can easily imagine that religiously trans-
mitted moral and ethical values may be replaced by others of
a more secular origin. That by no means implies that the
individual then has turned to a less moral or ethical life
conduct, but rather that his life conduct is not in the same
form influenced by religious values as it had been before
this replacement. In any case, what we have termed in our
scheme social and politcal relationship to society” is
simply this replacement of religious by secular values. As we
do not intend to contribute to the secularization debate with
additional confusing neologisms, we confine ourselves to this
description, and refrain from inventing the new term "social
secularization". Since the data available, unfortunately,
carry the appropriate information we would need only partial-
ly, as the frequency of church attendance, the age, the
religious preference, the socio-economic and social environ-
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ment, but no information about the participation in a
religious community nor the affiliation to the religious
taught or the individual's evaluation of the church's
authority (religious, social, political) in general, do
not try to use the data to end up with an incomplete survey
of our concern without being able to see at least some basic
developments. Rather, we shall use studies closely related to
our own project and shall try to gain some valuable informa-
tion from these for our own project. For the time being,
however, we shall first have a look at some essential aspects
Of the denominational and the party development after the
second world war in Germany, and then take a look at the
before-mentioned studies.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: PARTIES, CHURCHES, AND
POLITICAL SECULARIZATION ?
Catholicism
,
—Protestantism and Parties 1870 -1945
From the very beginning of this chapter it should be clear
that there are, of course, also other religions besides the
Catholic and the Protestant in Germany. Since, however, about
85 percent 90 of the German population belongs to one of these
two, we concentrate in the following discussion on these two
churches. A more important reason for our focus is that, all
over Europe towards the end of the 19th century, as Lipset
and Rokkan 9 1 have pointed out, the denominational cleavage
was a decisive aspect in the development of political
Par ^i es • Since Catholicism and Protestantism in Germany at
this time play a major role in the formation of political
parties
,
it is clear that the focus must lie on these two
denominations. We by no means undervalue the significance of
the other major religions in Germany such as the Jewish or
Islamic belief. But since these two religions are the biggest
90 According to Per Spiegel
. No. 23, 1984, p.78
91 Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. Party Systems and Voter
Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives
,
New York
1967, p.lOff
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groups among those remaining 15 percent of reiigions and
religious sects, we consider them in their political weight
far as the voting turnout is concerned as a negligeable
dimension
.
Though we shall confine our discussion of the two biggest
German churches to the post-war period, it is not possible to
understand the development without the historical context,
starting, at least, with the unification of the second German
Empire in 1870 and the Kulturkampf under Bismarck's rule. In
this period, German Catholicism was the religion of the
minority in an overall Protestant Empire. The Kulturkampf
represents clearly a conflict between the Catholic Church and
the secular state. Starting roughly with the infallibility
dogma of the Pope in 1870, the conflict between both the
Protestant German government and political Catholicism
(ultramontanism) is a conflict concerning the basis of
sovereign state power. In short, political Catholicism in
this period took Catholic belief and the papal primacy as a
basis for all state affairs and the doctrine of divine right
as the source of all governmental power and action. Against
this political Catholicism, the Bismarck government passed
various restrictive laws during the Kulturkampf, and,
thereby, tried to minimize every possible influence of
Catholic belief in state affairs. This included the, on the
whole, unsuccessful attempts to gain control over Catholic
priests by making them civil servants, the prohibition of the
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Jesuit congregation
, governmental rules concerning the
training of Catholic priests and ecclesiastical disciplinary
power. Also laws were passed which forbad political misuses
of sermons from the pulpit or made civil marriage possible.
culminated in a salary freeze for certain Catholic
officials. All these actions restricted Catholic adherents in
their politico-religious existence in Germany, but the same
actions failed on the whole in their effectiveness, due to
passive resistance not only by clerical incumbents, but also
because of the same resistance by lay Catholics in Germany
and the so-called Center-party
( Zentrumnartei )
. Between 1879
up to 1903 all these political restrictions were finally
abandoned again under Pope Leo VII; however, a general
bilateral distrust between the Catholic church and the state
remained
.
The Kul turkampf alone is, nevertheless, not the only reason
for the separation or alienation of the Catholics in the
second German empire. Rather, both alienation and segregation
are to be understood in the context of a clear circumscrip-
tion of the Catholic religion that had begun already at the
time of the Reformation. In this period there occurred a
distinctive separation of Catholics from the other German
religion, a common consciousness of all adherents of the
Catholic church, regionally as well as culturally, within the
entire German nation. In addition, the institutionalized and
structurally differentiated Catholic church organization and
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administration helped to secure
borders within German society.
and stabilize the religious
The Kulturkampf being finished. Catholics remained during the
entire life of the Weimar Republic an almost segregated
social group, which was, as we will see in turn, mobilized
and represented by one single bourgeois-conservative politi-
cal party, the Center-party ( Zentrumoart- i
The center-party itself was established by the Catholic
minority in 1871 '•...in order to have a political organiza-
tion that would protect its interests in what it conceived to
be a hostile atmosphere ..."» 2
. As Urwin has pointed out> the
Kulturkampf and such associations as the Zentralkomitee fur
deutsche Katholiken (est.1868) and the Volksverein fur das
katholische Deutschland test. 1890) helped to mobilize and
integrate Catholics within this political sphere:
The Zentrum was based on the Catholic religion:thus it sought to embrace all economic interests.Whenever Catholic interests conflicted withgovernment policy, the party presented a unitedfront to the outside world. However, it experiencedinternal tensions similar to those of otherChristian democratic parties when it considered
economic issues, which emphasized the differencesbetween its conservative and social democratic
sections
.
9 3
92 Urwin, Derek W.
, "Germany: Continuity and Change
Electoral Politics" in: Rose, Richard (ed.) Electoral
Behavior: A Comparative Handbook
. New York 1974,
P.109ff .
93 Urwin, D.W., op.cit. p.119
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During the second German empire. the Center party played a
role, being apart from the government and from other
political parties. In the Weimar Republic, after the first
World War, Catholic support of the party was still big enough
to make the party a considerable force; the party participa-
ted in governments more than other political parties of the
Weimar Republic. However, the support of the party by
Catholics declined in the 1920s. Urwin explains the drop in
support as being "...probably secularization" 94
. The number
of Catholics voting for the party declined from a high 86.3
percent in 1886 of all Catholics to a low 48.3 percent of
Catholic support in 1924. It is surprising that Urwin sees
secularization to be responsible for this large drop,
although he concedes that the support of the Center party is
strong in agrarian areas and low in urban areas, and also
that the party was the more successful, where there were more
religiously discriminating factors. With the internal
tensions in terms of economic policy in mind, we think that
secularization is too simplified an explanation of this fact.
Rather, since a substantial Catholic vote was given to other
parties
,
we think that the better representation of indivi-
dual economic interests by other parties account for this
decline much more than simply secularization, which might,
nevertheless, have occurred. This economic issue as well as
the gradual disappearance of discrimination against Catholics
94 Urwin, D.W., op.cit. p.121
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might, in contrast, explain more than a simple reference to
secularization. In any case, the important point here is
that the conservative Center-party was almost entirely
supported by Catholics, constantly, as Urwin has pointed out,
since the Center party, together with its Bavarian section
(Bayerische Volkspartei
- BVP), are the two parties among all
other political parties of the Weimar Republic that have the
most stable strength during the entire time period. Speaking
of the range of elasticity of voting strength and the
fluctuation of party support, Urwin has observed that
thl u
Y
-
the 2entrum / Bavarian People's Party duringe Weimar Republic was inelas tic ... Only fourresults are below 4 percent, those for the two
f^ S ®fVat iVe , partles of the Second Empire and thoseor the Zentrum m each time period. The relative
consistency of those four results emphasizes thelimited but constant electoral base of these par-ties. 95 ^
The Protestants, by contrast, never were in need of, nor able
to create, such a strongly organized, political, religious
attitude. They were not in need of it, because they represen-
ted the religious majority at the time and were in close
linkage to the politically powerful circles. In addition, the
denominational borderline could not appear to them, as it did
to the Catholics, as a major social or political threat.
Hence, the motivation for such a social mobilization was
95 Urwin, D.W., op.cit., p.125
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even if there had
simply missing on the Protestant side. But
been such a motivation, the Protestants would not have been
able to mobilize in such a concentrated form, since their
administrative organization and the ecclesiastical hierarchy
was not comparable to that of the Catholic church. In short,
a comparable development of a genuinely Protestant political
party did not occur, nor out of the denominational conflict
which appeared during the first decade of the second German
empire
.
Parties developed in the Protestant German population not
because of the denominational conflict, but within this major
religious part of the German society. As Oberndorfer,
Rattinger and Schmitt have pointed out 9 «
, liberalism and
conservatism developed within the democratic or constitutio-
nal movement, whereas, by contrast, social democratic
politics and bourgeois politics developed as a result of
Industrialization. Thus three political groups, with, as the
authors emphasize, entirely Protestant adherents had de-
veloped: conservatives, liberals and social democrats. None
of the three political forces, however, wanted to be, nor
could represent itself as being the typical Protestant party,
96 Oberndorfer D., Rattinger, H. and Schmitt, K. Wirt-
schaftlicher Wandel, religioser Wandel und Wertwan
del, in: Oberndorfer D., Rattinger H. and Schmitt, H.
( eds *) Wirtschaf tlicher Wandel, religioser Wandel.
Wertwandel
. Folgen fur das politische Verhalten in
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
. Ordo Politicus
Vol.25, publications of the Arnold-Bergs traesser-
Institute, Freiburg, 1984, p.23
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since, as „e already mentioned, party affiliation was, on
this side, simply not a matter of religious membership. Said
in a nutshell, whereas the Protestants developed political
parties and movements according to the socio-economic
fuses among this denominational majority in a diffuse
fashion, the Catholic political expression and representation
developed due to its discriminated political existence at the
ehd of the 19th century clearly as a consequence of the
religious conflict in a homogenous, clear-cut subsystem of
the German society.
Since it can be observed that the Catholic German population
maintained this cohesive group existence, it is a good idea
to trace the post-war period up to until recently from the
Catholic perspective. Several facts speak for this procee-
ding; first of all, Catholicism gained political weight as a
consequence of the division of Germany after the second World
War. Secondly, the political conflict between the Catholic
church and other political movements was re-established and
contributed a great deal to the party-political as well as
political development of the Federal Republic. Thirdly, as a
consequence, Catholicism became a decisive force in the
political discussion. Finally, as Catholicism remained a
cohesive religious group after the second World War and
during the following three decades, the societal and politi-
cal development of the Federal Republic and the Catholic
religious impact can properly be seen from this perspective.
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Needless to say that there are other perspectives well worth
to use as a general guideline to the political development in
this country - for example the unions' perspective, since we
are dealing, however, with religio-sociological questions, we
can meet two goals at one time; to learn about some basic
political and social developments of the Federal Republic
absolutely necessary for an understanding of the voting
behavior of the population and, secondly, to observe the
further development of Catholicism in the Federal Republic
of the Germany.
Catholics
,
—Protes tants, and Politics since 1945
Due to their nature of the religious teaching, the goals of
the Catholicism after the Second World War remained largely
unchanged. Regardless of changes over time, the teaching of
the Catholic church claims to set normative and compulsory
ethical guidelines, not only for the individual adherent, but
also for any political or governmental action. Questions of
political and ethical concern are, therefore, not the
business of the individual Christian conscience alone, nor a
pure matter of a free Catholic decision, but questions that
are to be solved by a believer in consideration of Catholic
belief and the special teaching responsibility of the
Catholic church itself. This is part of the Catholic church's
understanding of herself; the church takes it for granted
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that compulsory and definable ethical norms exist, norms
which are to be determined according to revelation and the
Bible. Gotto 9 7 has pointed out that the political and social
dimension of Catholicism and also its particular Weltanschau-
ung are to be explained with this background in mind.
After the Second World War, the political Catholicism of the
Weimar Republic, which had become concentrated in unions,
associations, and clubs partisanly gathered around the Center
party, was not revitalized. As Gotto has observed, the
differentiation between political and ecclesiastical Catholi-
cism that was clearly to be seen in the Weimar Republic, had
faded
.
Catholicism at the beginning of Federal Republic (1949) did
not, as during the empire, stand opposed to a development of
the time, but stood rather right in the middle of a societal
and political renewal in which the Catholic population of
West Germany was almost equal in quantity to that of the
Protestants. Therefore, the question of the relationship
between the Catholic church and the state had to be rede-
fined, too. An overall consensus existed between the Catholic
Church and Catholic political circles that a renewal of a
confessional party, as well as the participation of priests
Gotto, K., Wandlungen des politischen Katholizismus
seit 1945. in: Oberndorfer D., Rattinger H., and
Schmitt, K
.
( eds
. ) Wir tschaf t licher Wandel
, reliqioser
Wandel und Wertwandel. Folqen fur das politische
Verhal ten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
. Ordo
politicus, Vol.25, 1984, publications of the Arnold-
Bergstreasser-Institute, Freiburg, p.221ff
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m political offices would be out of question. Agreement on
both sides also existed that a clear-cut distinction had to
be made between the political task of the party and the
theological healing task of the church. As a consequence of
these decisions, the successor to the old Center party was
the CDU (and, in Bavaria the sister-party CSU)
, an intercon-
fessionally designed Christian catch-all party, which showed
a clear attachment to religious commitment but also a clearly
influential separation between religious and political power.
The Catholic church thought optimistically of a future party
system, in which the church would be equally close to every
political party in the Federal Republic, taking for grated
that the political parties would be friendly towards the
churches. The Catholic church conceived the political events
that culminated in the end of World War II in 1945 as the
result of a false secular, historical, and political develop-
ment, showing evidence against the politico-materialistic
ideas of socialism and liberalism. Accorfing to the Catholic
Church, in short, the traditional conflict of world views had
to diminish according to the experience of the advancing
decades. By contrast, however, both liberals and social
democrats emphasized anew their liberal and socialistic
P^^^i'^ms . For the church, an equidistance to all three major
parties — the CDU, SPD, FDP — was therefore hardly to be
realized. The strong support of the CDU by the Catholic
church is thus to be understood as a reaction to the anti-
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ecclesiastical programs of the two other major German
parties. This reaction of the Catholic Church expressed
itself firtsly during the development of the Grundgesetz in
1948/49, when the Catholic population was mobilized in view
of this anti-catholic threat to submit numerous addresses to
the Parlamentary council to insure that Catholic interests
were considered. As these intersts were obviously considered,
the Catholics found themselves able to agree and identify
widely with not only a constitutional law and a governmental
system but also with a political party that generally pursued
their social, economic and political interests. In addition,
the charismatic person of the first Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer, who was, in fact, a Catholic, symbolized to a
considerable extent the new identity of the Catholics insofar
die Herrrschaf tsorganisation der Bundesrepublik
,
das Rollenverstandnis der politischen Eliten und die
Amtsauf f assung Konrad Adenauers auf dem Hintergrund
der iiberwundenen Minderheitssi tuation der Katholi-
ken, selbst das der katholischen Kirche verandert
haben
.
9 8
The identification of Catholicism with the CDU culminated in
the late 1950s with the Catholic ecclesiastical statements
declaring that even a Catholic worker could not vote for the
98 Wildenmann, R. Die soziale Basis der Ara Adenauer,
in: Blumenwitz D., Gotto, K.
,
Maier, H.
,
Repgen K.
,
Schwarz, H.-P., (eds.) Konrad Adenauer und seine
Zeit . Politik und Personlichkei t des ersten Bundes-
kanzlers
, Cologne 1976, p.279
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SPD. The next decades can be characterized as a change in the
catholic Church from within, a de-ideologizing tendency of
the German political parties, and a general drop in the
Catholic church attachment.
The papal encyclical "ater et magistra" and the pastoral
constitution ''gaudium et spes" were meant to open the
Catholic Church to a greater society. On the side of the
political parties, the SPD de-ideoligized insofar as it
abolished the Marxist teaching from its platform (1959,
Godesberger Program)
. In Lower Saxony a concordat in 1965
between the Catholic church and the SPD guaranteeing the
continued support of state supported-religious elementary
schools "...was taken as a concession of the SPD to church
interests 9 9
. The CDU, on the other side, started discussions
about the appropriateness of the "C" in its party name in a
time of a general political objectification. As Baker et al
.
have pointed out, these developments did not meet the
expectations which had been expected:
It was expected that the social democrats' policies
of rapproachment with the Catholic church and the
general secularization of society would produce a
decline in religious polarization, but this has not
occurred ... 1 0 0
99 Baker K.
,
Dalton R.
,
and Hildebrandt D. op.cit.
,
p.181
1 0 0 ibidem
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General secularizing tendencies, as Gotto interprets the
matter
, and a generational change in the Catholic support
contributed to the decline of the ecclesiastical political
influence of it adherents. In the 1969 federal elections this
distancing of Catholics from direct influence and the changed
evaluation of the political authority of the Catholic church
became visible for the « , .n nrst time. Over a third of the
Catholic voters casted their ballot for the SPD.
Paradoxically, the Catholic church is herself accountable for
this decline in authority. The churches effort to give new
impulse to the religious life, coupled with a simultaneous
fading of religious value convictions and societal norms has
produced the result, curiously enough, that the Catholic
church has been attacked quite generally and blamed for an
alleged tendency to clericalisation
. Hence it is not surpri-
sing that the Catholic Church has spent the following period
up to the present, in thinking and debating her disillusion-
ment and simultaneously grasping for possibilities as to how
her lost influence and political importance could be re-
gained. There were two extreme positions in this discussion;
pluralism and an open dialogue, being understood as the
foundation for a new self-understanding of the church, or at
least as a minimal consensus, was one of the positions. The
Political Catholic theology argued, on the other side for a
new social-critical role for the church, presenting the
picture of the Catholic church as a partner in questions
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•'limited" to matter of common moral and ethical concern. It
goes without saying that with such an imprecise and unstable
theological und social self-understanding the church was
unable to bring about a satisfatory clarification of her
position to the political parties.
At the same time, that is, after the federal elections of
1972, the SPD underwent a process of re-ideologization in
questions concerning divorce, as well as in its the general
position and the FDP became more ideological concerning, for
example, abortion. Also, programmatic statements of both
parties defining their relationship to the churches made
clear that these parties conceived the church to be at the
margin of the German society. Party pronouncements in this
period confirmed the Catholic Church's suspicion that the
opening of the parties in 1960s to the Catholic church had
primarily been a party-political attempt to gain access to
religious, Catholic voters. The Catholic Church's more recent
attempt to redefine her political goals has focused on the
question of how religious values, their validity and justifi-
cation can be made independent from temporal societal
developments and societal evaluation of those values through
electoral majority decision. This discussion and re-orienta-
tion to those parties that come closest to meeting the norms
and limits determined from revelation and the Bible is
recognizable in recent pastoral letters of the German
Catholic Bishop's Conference to their religious communities
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in 1980 and 1983.
Since we have reached the very most recent state of affairs,
it is now time to make a few remarks in conclusion concernign
an appropriate direction for further study. There is a
meandering motion in the Catholic church's relation to the
German society. Starting with an unsuccessful attempt to take
a more or less neutral position to each German political
party in the young Federal Republic, the church has slowly
come to realize that its policy has been too idealistic and
too optimistic. A close linkage to the interconfessionally
designed CDU has been an easily understandable reaction to
this new ideological polarization. The consideration of the
church's interests from the very beginning by the Parliamen-
tary Council in its design of the Grundgesetz and the later
representation of Catholic interests by the charismatic
Konrad Adenauer have given way to a rapid identification of
Catholics with the new state as a major force in the estab-
lishment of the political system
. That with this development
a solid majority for the CDU was guaranteed is no accident
but an intended consquence of the political assurance of the
Catholic church's interests. This can be seen in statements
of the Catholic Bishop's Conference in their pastoral letters
in advance of every federal election. The generational change
in the late fifties which was accompanied by a generally
observable decline in religious memberships and church
attachment, in other words the secularizing process, was the
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“in rSaSOn f°r Che in authority of this ti». The
loss in authority was strengthened by general societal
developments in the mid sixties and the failed or misunder-
stood attempt to open the church to a bigger part of society.
One should view the approach of the Catholic church to the
Social Democrats, and vice versa, with the de-ideologization
and platform-change in mind. Having dramatically lost in
terms of societal importance (through sinking numbers of
adherents) the Catholic church has faded considerably from
her former political position and from her location at the
center of public interest. By the end of the seventies,
finally, the religious definition of the relationship of
parties to the Catholic Church has again produced an ideolo-
gical polarization, but one that is not as strong as in the
beginning of the Federal Republic.
Thus the Catholic church continues to emphasize a fundamental
orientation of politics to norms which can be determined from
revelation and the Bible, but she has considerably lost
political influence and importance, even among her own
adherents
.
Finally a look to the Protestants seems appropriate. A
general survey of the Protestant church's political engage-
ment should finish the discussion of the religio-political
history and recent background of the Federal Republic.
Basically there can be seen to be two traditional strains in
German Protestantism, both of which can be traced back to
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strain
Luther and the Reformation. The Reformed and "United-
draws on the writing of the young Luther ("On the liberty of
a Christian"), and therefore expresses a religiously and
politically more progressive and emancipatory interpretation
of Protestantism. The Lutherans, by contrast, orient them-
selves to the elder Luther and his model of the two kingdoms.
Put in a nutshell, the model of the two kingdoms explains
divine authority acting in two different worlds - in the
first, the secular, God rules in manifold ways in the form of
the laws and governmental actions. A given government is
therefore to be accepted and respected by every Protestant
believer. In the other world, the ecclesiastical, God rules
by his divine love and by giving teaching responsibility to
pastors, priests, and ministers who interpret the divine will
by a close interpretation of the Bible. The worldly nature of
this tradition leans towards a conservative political point
of view, supporting civil obedience according to the govern-
mental structure of the state and its system of law and
order
.
While the Lutheran tradition dominated Germany in the 19th
century and with it a God-given, Prussian consitutional
monarchy, a difficult and ambiguous situation confronted the
Protestants during the Weimar Republic. Suddenly there was no
longer a government with God-given authority, but a purely
political system, which gained its legitimation and so-
vereignty through a mere human, civic constitutional process.
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Even if the Lutheran tradition did not lose not its basic
theological model of explanation, Protestantism on the whole
experienced for the first time a considerable weakening.
Although the Protestant Church lacked cohesive self-under-
standing and coherent political representation with mobili-
zing power throughout the second German empire and the Weimar
Republic, the weakness became fatal only in the Third Reich.
The Nazis had easy access to the Protestant church by
founding a church seemingly appropriate to the time, the
’Deutsche Christen", a Protestant movement with a clear
orientation to, and dependency on, the Nazi government. Only
after the establishment of this group did Protestantism see
itself forced to respond in terms of a clearly defined
political and theological postion, namely that of the
Bekennenden Kirche" and the Barmen declaration of 1934.
Stammler 1 0
1
has summarized the whole Protestant experience
of the Third Reich in a proportional analogy: "... what
Bismarck had been for the Catholics during the Kulturkampf,
Hitler was for the Protestants during the Third Reich."
The post-war period saw a renaissance of the two traditional
Protestant strains with a "United" Protestantism dominating.
The necessaria, inner-ecclesiastical debate about the new
101 Stammler, E. Politische Stromungen im deutschen
Protes tantismus
,
in: Oberndorfer D., Rattinger, H.
,
Schmi tt , K
.
( eds
. ) Wir tschaf tlicher Wandel ,religioser
Wandel und Wertwandel . Folqen fur das politische Ver -
hal ten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
. Ordo poli-
ticus, Vol.28, publications of the Arnold-Berg-
straesser-Institute, Freiburg, 1984, p.238
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structures after the church had regained a position guaran-
teed by the state, was, however, never completed. Instead, the
Protestant Church, which, unable to negotiate with secular
state power as the Catholic Church did, the Protestant Church
has only imperfectly imitated the administrative and organi-
zational structures of the Catholic church. Reformed Protes-
tantism has acted without a clearly defined religio-political
concept but participated opportunistically in the protest
movements of the time. Regardless of the topic - whether
rearmament and NATO, peaceful usage of nuclear energy, or
abortion and divorce - political protest was backed by a
Protestant Church that used this form of political participa-
tion as a substitute for the construction and/or renewal of
her inner structures. With regard to the political parties.
German Protestantism has divided along the lines of the
socio-economic status of its members combined with adherence
to one or the other Protestant traditional strains. Until
today, Protestantism has remained in this ambiguous and
undefined position, all the while actively participating in
the peace-movement of the 1980 s.
German Protestantism has simply never managed to develop a
cohesive religious community nor its own, politically
coherent and mobilizing force and identity.
It is easy to conceive that the declining importance of the
Catholic church and the less coherent Protestant identity
might have direct influences on the political perception and
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Participation of their adherents
information, we shall now turn
extent religious traditions and
Since this is a essential
to the question, as to what
convictions, as well as the
impact of the church, determine the political party identifi-
cation and the actual voting decision. Having answered this
question, we shall then turn to a study which undertakes the
attempt of a change-over-time-analysis, from which it should
be possible to determine whether voting decision can be,
generally, used as an indicator of secularization.
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CHAPTER V
INDICATIONS OF SECULARITY ?
A study by Pappi- 2 dealing with the denominational-religious
cleavage of the German electorate produced impressive
results, which bear interesting implications for our own
study. Even if the study was meant to focus on a better
understanding of the denominational-religious cleavage, the
data and results of this study are of great value for the
argument in the present study. They show, to present them in
advance, that church attachment has a much greater influence
with respect to party identification on Catholics than it has
on Protestants. Also, by contrast, Protestants are more
influenced by their individual religious convictions in their
party identification than are Catholics. Furthermore, the
former denominational cleavage is still observable, but
overlaid by a general religion-versus-secularity issue.
Finally, an important but not decisive factor is represented
by the regional denominational distribution of the adherents
of both churches. On the Protestant side, the ratio of the
102 Pappi, F.U., Die konfessionell-religiose Konflikt
linie in der deutschen Wahlerschaf t : Entstehung,
Stabilitat und Wandel. in: Oberndorfer, D., Rattin-
ger, H., Schmitt, K. (eds.) Wirtschaf tlicher Wandel,
reliqioser Wandel und Wertwandel. Folqen fur das
politische Verhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land
, Ordo politicus, Vol.25, publications of the
Arnold-Bergstraesser-Insititute
,
Freiburg, 1984,
p.263
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to a certain extent the party affiliation. On the whole, the
results produce useful information about the impact of
religion on voting.
A 1982 representative German aggregate data survey is the
basis for Pappi's study. He took the church attendance
frequency as an indicator of church attachment, subdividing
the adherents according to their frequency of their church
attendance into four categories: core members (attend church
at least once a month), marginal members (less than once a
month), formal members (never attend church) and former
members. Already here the difference in the meaning of church
attendance for the two different denominations becomes
obvious in the distribution of the adherents
' church atten-
dance frequency. For example, according to the given catego-
rization, 47 percent of Catholics can be defined as core
members, whereas, on the Protestant side, only 17 percent can
be found in this category. The Protestant majority, by
contrast, can be found in the group of marginal members
representing two thirds of all Protestants.
The control for party identification shows the first result,
that the impact of church attendance frequency on Catholics
is bigger than that for Protestants. This becomes most clear
if one looks at the core member columns of both denomina-
tions .
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Table l 1 °3 Church Attachment and P arty Identification
Party ID
core
Catholics
marg form ex
members
%
Protestants
core marg form ex
members
%
CDU/CSU 80.3 48.4 34.4 18.5 60.7 37.4 36.0 14.9
SPD 15.6 44.2 51.1 44
.
4
23
.
6
51 .
8
53.6 51.4
FDP 2.9 4.5 7.8 22.2 12.9 8
.
3
5.6 14 .
9
GRONE 1.2 2.9 6.7 14
.
8
2 .
8
2
.
4
4.8 18
.
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Non-ad-
herents
21.2 30.5 38 .
2
36.7 28.4 31.4 40.3 36.7
No answ. 8
.
1
8.3 7.3 8.2 9.3 11.9 10.3 8.2
N 590 509
1
165 49 225 872 253 49
Source: Pappi
, F.U., 1982
From the above table it can be determined that the degree of
church attendance has a considerable impact on Catholic core
members and their party identification with the CDU/CSU. 80.3
percent of the Catholic core members identify with this
party. By clear contrast, the appropriate Protestant group
does not identify that strongly with the same party. Concer-
103 Pappi 's table also includes the distribution of non-
Christians and other Christians. This is to some
extent necessary for his project; for our concern,
we can, without falsifying the picture, concentrate
in the following on only the appropriate results of
the Catholic and Protestant respondents.
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ning the marginal members, one can see that the identifica-
tion of Catholics with the CDU is still higher in comparison
with the same group's affiliation with the SPD. A look at the
Protestant marginal member column shows the opposite result
and confirms again the higher impact of church attendance on
party identification among Catholics. Pappi interprets this
fact as a remainder from the former denominational conflict.
The greater importance of personal religious conviction in
determining the voting decision of Protestants is the second
result of the study, giving us again some insight into the
two different denominational motivations for a voting
decision. As it was discovered by a Dutch study 1 <> < of reli-
gious convictions, which used 42 indicators of religious
convictions, the most salient point was the belief in the
existence of God, and the Christian interpretation of life,
suffering and death. The questions asked in Pappi
' s study,
therefore concentrated on both aspects. An equal distribution
of answers to every question in both denominations among all
four member categories excludes thus the hypothesis that the
reason for the different party identification among the
denominations is a consequence of a different religious
104 Felling, A., Peters, J., Schreuder, Oswald, Identi-
tatswandel in den Niederlanden
,
Kolner Zeitschrift
ftir Sozioloqie und Sozialps vcholoaie
. Vol.34, No . 1
,
1982, p . 26f
f
Even if the results of this survey are strikingly
significant, it remains a controversial question
whether such an issue can really be examined in a
empirical-analytical fashion.
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convictions distribution. The second result we ^
mentioned develops, however, fro, another consideration.
Analyzing the relationship between church attachment,
religious conviction and party identification, one can
observe that both factors are equally important for the
Protestants, whereas, on the other side, the significance of
church attendance for Catholics assumes a value which is
three times as high as for Protestants. Hence one can say,
that the importance of the individual religious conviction
for identification with a party is much more significant for
Protestants than for Catholics. Note, however, that control-
ling for religious conviction shows a still considerable role
of church attendance even for Protestants.
A last result from the Pappi study touches the regional
distribution of Catholics and Protestants in the Federal
Republic and the impact of region on the denominational
voting decision. The geographic distribution of Catholics and
Protestant goes generally along a North-South-line
. Protes-
tants concentrated more in the North than in the South. A
division of the geographic distribution in three different
types has therefore been undertaken. According to the primary
administrative division of the Lander (Regierungsbezirke
)
these regions have been divided into predominantly Catholic
or predominantly Protestant and mixed areas. The party
identification controlling for regional distribution and
church attachment shows the following results:
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Table 2:
a) Protestant areas
members (percent)
Party ID core marginal formal total
CDU 72.1 40 .
9
44.7 46
.
4
SPD 23 .
3
51 .
8
50
.
0
47
.
1
FDP 4.6 7.3 5.3 6.6
Total % 100
.
0
100.0 100
. 100
.
0
Non adhe-
rents %
23.2 31.0 43.6 32.2
N = 69 352 94 515
Table 3:
b) mixed areas
members (percent)
Party ID core marginal formal total
CDU 61.0 38
.
2
39.1 42.9
SPD 23.4 52.3 53.1 46.6
FDP 15.6 9.5 7
.
8
10 .
5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 .
0
Non-adhe-
rents %
30 .
0
30 .
1
39.2 31 .
8
N = 130 425 125 680
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Table 4:
c) Catholic areas
members (percent)
Party ID core marginal formal total
CDU 43.7 29.2 17.6 29
.
6
SPD 31.3 62.5 82.4 60
.
5
FDP 25.0 8
.
3
— 9.9
Total % 100
.
0
100
.
0
100.0 100
.
0
Non-adhe-
rents %
34.6 38.9 35.3 37
.
4
N = 26 95 34 155
Source a) through c): Pappi, F.U., 1982
If one compares the contents of the tables, the importance of
the regional distribution gains significance particularly in
respect to the Protestant party identification. The regional
denominational distribution has, by contrast, no influence on
the party identification of Catholics. As we already know,
church attendance is in this religion the significant
indicator for a prediction of the party identification.
On the whole, the regional factor seems to be rooted in
historical context. Pappi argues that the "catholic voting
behavior" of Protestants in Protestant-dominated areas is
due to the residual influence of the organizational structure
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Of the center party. In mixed and Catholic areas ^
CDU adherents simply continued after World War II „ith the
traditional policy of the Center party. Important decisions
had already been made under particular consideration of
Catholic interests and decisive functions and offices had
been filled with Catholic incumbents. Protestant participa-
tion in, or identification with, the CDU, therefore, was very
difficult and not very likely. Rudimentary parts of the
denominational conflict remained, therefore, in these areas.
In Protestant dominated areas another development took place.
The Center party was not represented in every voting district
of the second German empire or the Weimar Republic. Hence,
the CDU could continue to build upon the Center-party's
political legacy. In these areas, corresponding to the reli-
gious majority of the population living in them, Protestants
were the movers and initiators of the CDU structure and
organization. An identification and participation of Protes-
tants was therefore a natural consequence in respect to the
geographic distribution of denominations and party identifi-
cations .
The three aspects we have discussed here obviously do not
explain every aspect of secularization. But they provide
enough information to make certain reflections and supposi-
tions possible. The data discussed have one striking aspect
°ur secularization question. They show, regardless of the
fact that they are based on a aggregate data analysis at a
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single point in time, that church attachment is a valid
indicator for the religiously and denominationally determined
voting decision and an important stabilizer of the religious
vote
.
If church attachment were to decline further, what conse-
quences could then be expected ? it seems very likely that
the clearly religiously oriented voting today would then be
in decline, too. This, in turn, would mean that the dichoto-
my, religiosity-secularity would increase advantageously on
the secularity side. The considerable part of religious votes
would fade, and thus have an enormous impact on general
political conditions and the strength of the political
parties. In other words, the contrast between the German
political parties would diminish, due to the fact that
probably only the orthodox ("core") members of a church would
vote in a mainly religious fashion, and the majority of
today’s religiously motivated votes would disappear as a
consequence of a decreasing tension between religion and
secularism. That does not mean a deterministic development
towards a "de-conf essionalization" of the party system. It
is, however, conceivable that religiously motivated voting
only plays an important role in such moral and ethical issues
as abortion, divorce, etc. One development has already
pointed in this direction. It is the opening of both the SPD
and the Catholic church towards each other in the mid-1960s.
At that time, a formerly anti-ecclesiastical party became a
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voting option even tor the Catholic population. In short, it
close linkage of the Catholic church to the CDU were to
decrease, then the denominational or confessional aspect of
the party system in the Federal Republic would be very likely
to change in the above-mentioned ways.
Surely, we have gone too far in the interpretation of our
since they are not meant to predict possible new
developments; however, we have gained significant information
about two things that are highly interesting and important in
the context of the present study; first of all, our recommen-
dation to take the frequency of church attendance as an
indicator for church attachment and not for religiosity has
been proved to be correct, or at least more promising, as a
way of approaching an analysis of secularization. And,
secondly, we have some good reasons to conceive voting
behavior analyzed over time - if that is done in an approp-
riate and careful fashion - to be one indicator among others,
worth using, and looking at, in the analysis of seculariza-
tion
.
A study by Schmitt103 examining the factors of religious
voting also tries to deal with the further development of
105 Schmitt, K. Religiose Bes timmungsf aktoren des
Wahlverhal tens : Entkonfesssionalisierung mit
Verspatung ?, in: Oberdorfer, D., Rattinger, H.
,
Schmitt, K., (eds.) Wirtschaf tlicher Wandel,
reliqios er Wandel und Wertwandel. Folgen fur das
poli t ische Verhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land, Ordo politicus, Vol.25, publications of the
Arnold-Bergstraesser-Insti tute
,
Freiburg, 1984
p.291
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religious voting. since necessary data for an analysis over
time is missing, Schmitt tries to bypass this deficit by
replacing the analysis over time with an analysis of age
peers. Since he is aware of the implication of such a
substitution, he uses a method that might also be worth using
for a study not dealing with religious voting motives but
with developing processes of secularization.
The assumption on which Schmitt's study is based, is that
there is a certain development in the individual life cycle
which can account for the stability (or instability) of
religious voting. Accepting this assumption, one can select a
several aspects which can describe probable developments over
time. The decision to vote for the CDU in relation to age and
denomination is the analytical starting point.
Table 5:
CDU-voting over denomination and age
Denomination 60 and older 30 - 59 18 - 29
Catholic 70 % 62 % 42 %
N = 125 291 110
Protestant 42 % 39 % 33 %
N = 155 304 95
Source: Schmitt, K., 1984
The data show that the difference between Catholic and
Protestant voting for the CDU is decreasing, the younger the
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respondents are. The question which one might ask, therefore,
would be whether the religious voting motivation becomes less
and less important the more the older generation drops out of
the electoral process. And if that were the case, could a
change in church attachment and in the individual’s link to
his denomination account for this decrease in the religious
factor ?
To answer these questions, Schmitt performed a regression
analysis controlling for church attachment and individual
denominational relation in each of the three age groups; the
results showed that the relation of voting for the CDU and
church attachment, as well as the individual denominational
link, decreases in the younger age groups. In addition, the
respondent’s evaluation of the political authority of the
church was surveyed. If we include this evaluation in the
regression analysis, it becomes obvious, again, that the
younger the age groups, the less is the impact of the politi-
cal authority of the church on the respondent's voting
decision. However, it is important to note that the weaker
support of the CDU from younger voters is not based on the
decreased influence of church attachment or on the indivi-
dual's relation to her/his denomination, but because the
number of those respondents in the youngest age group who
place value on the political authority of the church and who
are closely linked to their denomination is drastically lower
than in all other age groups. Given the fact that this number
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age groups then
would be roughly equal to those of the other
the part voting for the CDU would be of roughly the same
size
.
If one keeps these results in mind, one can gain some ideas
concerning future developments under two assumptions. First,
a stabile church attachment (regardless of whether negative
or positive) and a stable individual relationship to his/her
denomination throughout life has to be assumed. Secondly, a
constant individual development of church attachment and
relationship to the denomination should be assumed. The two
assumptions are important. If there is no constancy in
individual development, nor any stability in the relation to
both variables, then a reasonable analysis over time is not
possible
.
The two assumptions themselves are not necessarily the
idealistic phantasy of a scientist gazing at figures and
tables, that can be operationally specified.
The implication of the two assumptions is simply that it is
less likely that church attachment or agreement with the
political authority of the church will increase among the
younger voters as they become older. Such a trend would only
then be conceivable, if individuals were linked with the
church early in their lives. Only for such people would it be
possible during their youth or during their early adulthood,
to deviate from their agreements and later turn back again to
both their former acknowledgement of church authority and
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their personal realtionship to the denomination
.
where this early linkage to the church is missing,
implication is less likely to occur. The important
IS that this early linkage with the church, termed
In cases,
the above
point now
religious
socialization
,
the question
important role
role religion
is on the decrease, even among Catholics, if
asked whether religion has played or plays an
in their education, the results show that the
Plays in education is steadily in decline:
Table 6:
Religious education, denomination, and age
Age cohorts (in percent)
Denomination > 60 45 - 59 30 - 44 18 - 29
Catholic 56 52 31 25
N = 154 170 170 127
Protestant 35 20 14 11
N = 189 166 186 117
Source: Schmitt, K. 1984
This decline is, it seems, a generational process. As soon as
a succeding, less religiously educated, generation itself
becomes the parental generation, their children, in turn,
will again be less religiously educated. The development
which seems to occur is, hence, that over time the succeeding
generations will be less religious than their predecessors.
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For our study that would mean a constant secularizing process
has been observed. We can easily check this point. As we look
at our last table, we see that the biggest decrease takes
Place in the Catholic age groups 45/59 to 30/44. We know that
the data have been collected in 1982. Thirty years back from
that is the year 1952. Assuming that not all of the respon-
dents cannot exactly remember the days of their early
childhood but, for example, some five years later, we also
know that a secularizing movement developed in the late 1950s
in which the Catholic church was also involved, loosing as
many as half of her adherents in the upcoming generation.
Hence, at least for this age group, the socio-religious
development seems to confirm the findings shown in the table.
However, it still seems reasonable to insist on a cautious
interpretation of the data. First of all, the model is based
on the assumption of human constancy and stability. The
reasons for these assumptions appear to be plausible; never-
theless the subject under study are human beings, who need
not always be - certainly not throughout their entire lives-
as constant as is assumed here. Secondly, we must not forget
that this was a model dealing with change over time based on
representative, aggregate data of 1982. The model has surely
served its purpose if it points to several possible develop-
ments. In using different, yet equally sophisticated, statis-
tical methods, it has been shown with data concerning one
point in time that a decline of religion and its appropriate
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influence on the voting decision is now appearing
it is less likely, but is this enough evidence
Admittedly
to believe-
given the same political conditions - that the now older age
groups didn’t have the same political
youth as the youth of today ?
attitudes in their
Our point is simply that we do not take Schmitt's model for a
completely reliable instrument to show that a change over
time has occurred or is occurring. For a serious analysis of
such a phenomenon and some reliable and valid conclusions
drawn from it, only appropriate data, used and analyzed in
the way of Pappi and Schmitt, covering a reasonably long time
period can do the job. We agree, however, with Schmitt, since
he also observes that the necessary data for a change-over-
time-analysis is lacking, that certain promising indications
were gained by substituting for the missing data an age-
group-data-analysis
. Even if we can draw no precise and
detailed conclusions from all this, our point has again been
confirmed through Schmitt's analytical change-over-time
model; religious voting can be a valid and additional, though
limited, indicator of secularization.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Secularization, it seems, remains both difficult to discuss
as a theoretical concept and also hard to describe analyti-
cally as a social phenomenon. Several concepts have been
debated in this study, but not one, it appears, seems to be
able to account for all the things that have to be included
in the term secularization. But this is no vice. Rather, it
is a consequence of the scientific quest to get a definite
hold of this phenomenon. Let's put it for a moment in another
context: Secularization is a two-headed "animal". The first
head consists of two parts named the "private" and the
public sphere"; the second is divided into an individual and
a societal part. Scientists are the specialized "battlers" of
this hydra, trying to give special martial advice to every
one trying to attack one part of one of the two heads.
Unfortunately, the scientific warriors always become em-
broiled in strategic debates among themselves baout the right
way to attack the monster; although their debates are, on the
whole, very helpful in the effort to deal with each of the
four parts, they finally miss the original target of their
quarrel; to gain control over the two-headed beast. In the
end, even if the best strategies have been found, the animal
has escaped.
This scenario, admittedly a bit exaggerated, captures,
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however, we fear, an important truth. The theorists of
secuiarization discuss conscientiously and resourcefully the
levels of analysis, and the different forms and outcomes of
secularization. Analyses actually carried out in the proposed
ways, however, rare as they are, show only disappointing
results. Most of them are entirely descripitive
. They give
ratios of denominations in a country at different times,
changing connotations of rituals, frequences of church
attendance, and so forth - all properly listed; but none of
them is capable of even a rough explanation of secula-
rization. Is there really, in the end, no way to show an
unmistakably empirical evidence of secularization ? Surely
there is none, as long as there is such a confusing variety
of conceptions of what has to be understood as seculariza-
tion. These various conceptions are like the confusing array
of martial advices we referred to in our parable above. The
escaping animal, to stick for a moment to this picture, is a
perpetually changing society that might never be caged in a
single concept of secularization. Hence, the scientific,
theoretical, discussion is bound never to reach an end.
Dobbelaere tried to tie two main strains together, namely the
individual and the societal levels of analysis, and he
thereby gained a huge mosaic of all the parts of seculari-
zation; but simultaneously he demonstrated with his approach
that one can never sufficiently adumbrate secularization in
one single analysis. Hence, like it or not, analytical
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patchwork must remain. Specialized analyses have to be made
- thus tearing apart Dobbelaere’s work in order to supply
the entire secularization mosaic with its neccessary parts.
our patchwork here was an attempt to develop a schematic
model as to how one can use the individual's political
decision as an indicator for secularization. We created a
model that tried to refine certain t- - _ c, • • ,am traditional measurements
in a fashion that might give the desired information. During
the construction of this model, it became clear that neither
church attachment nor individual religious preference alone
could be used without a more distinct differentiation to
account successfully for secularization. Nor did it seem wise
to use both variables, at least in this special context, as a
more complex variable of religiosity 1
0
*
. in our model some
twelve additional questions were suggested that promise to
complete the missing information. To be sure, this questio-
naire is by no means operationalized nor does it pretend to
be complete. Much more discussion, particularly as to whether
these questions are received by the respondents in the
implied way, will be required. Be that as it may, a founda-
tion for further study has been the genuine goal of this
model. This further study has dealt, in turn, with the
106 If we had done so, we would have confirmed
Luckmann 1 s argument, who indicts the empirical ana-
lysts to make no difference between religiosity and
church attachment, nor even more generally between
church and religion itself.
in: Luckmann, T.
,
The Invisible Religion
, New York
1967, p. 14-20.
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as an
question as to what extent voting decisions can be used
indicator of secularization.
The two studies discussed (Pappi's and Schmitt’s) showed that
voting decision can reasonably, but only in a limited way, be
used as an indicator of secularization. Several reasons may
account for this result. There is, first of all, the voting
decision itself. The turnout by itself, taken as the sole
indicator gives no helpful information simply because it is
too general a measurement. Only in linkage with the additio-
nal information about the voter's church attachment, which is
again subdivided in different levels of membership and the
additional information about the voter's general religious
and social background and environment (education, family) and
her/his age, can helpful results be gained. This does not
mean however, that one can simply take these bits of informa-
tion one by one and immediately assign them an interpreta-
tion. By themselves, the variables referred to bear no more
information than the voting turnout itself. Rather, it takes
sophisticated statistical methods to relate them to each
other. Then, and only then, can reasonably valid information
about stable or changing developments of secularization be
given
.
Again, it has to be noted that the above described approach
is nothing but a substitute for an analysis-over-time method.
Were these data be available, a perhaps much clearer picture
would emerge. For the time being, however, we have to satisfy
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ourselve
gained i
Election
promised
election
S ”lth thS given data
- But even with this indirectly
nformation, certain suppositions can be offered.
after election certain German political voices
and even emphasized that the latest was the last
in which religion would play a decisive role in the
voting turnout and that everything would be totally different
in forthcoming elections. The have had to repeat themselves
several times. what they had in mind was simply the same
assumption that Schmitt made in advance of his analysis:
there would be constant development of the individual and,
additionally, constant political "enlightenment". The
decisive mistake they made is that a constant individual
development (in whatever religiously related direction) need
not logically result in political change. Although such
change is very likely according to the tables we have given
above, it is not a necessary consequence of them.
It can be assumed, according to Schmitt's analysis, that with
the development shown (religious education in decline and its
implications for the party preference) a change in the voting
turnout of the Catholic German electorate (de — emphasizing the
CDU vote) might occur sometime in the future; - if we leave
out of consideration religious revivalism as it appears today
in the world in general
,
and to some extent in the German
peace movement in particular. We have certain indications,
that an emancipation from the church, and also a greater
distance of the relationship between the individual and
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her/his denomination will occurr; in other words, „e can then
expect another secularizing wave like the one we already have
observed in Germany in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.
in any case, precise evalutations require, as it became
obivious with Schmitt's attempt, observations of the same
indicators over a long period of time. Looking at the German
development from 1945 up to the present, we can see incon-
stancies all over the place. The Catholic Church deviated
from her hard-liner position and tried an opening to a bigger
society, later redefined her position and has now approached
a location again not too far from her original starting
point. The only decisive difference is that she has lost, in
the meantime, power, influence and adherents. The political
parties, the CDU/CSU, the FDP
,
and the SPD first became de-
ideologized the mid 1960s and then became ideologized all
over again in the late 1970s. The population itself is still
religiously oriented in its politcal evaluation. The denomi-
national conflict has disappeared, however, moral and ethical
questions are still closely discussed and considered reli-
giously .
Seen in this particularly German context, a secularization
analysis is indeed a complex enterprise, certainly if it
tries to be more than a mere descriptive survey. Hence,
scientific methods, even if they look suspiciously artifical
to a green but critical, observer, have to be used to get
interesting ideas out of all this. If one accepts this
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careful and
methodological neccessity, being sufficiently
reasonable in terms of the applied statist!
behavior, coupled with
cs
, then voting
neccessary supplementary information
and assumptions in mind, can be
indicator of secularization.
a valid and surely reliable
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